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Foreword
There is little doubt that Greenfield foreign direct investments (FDIs) are one of the major 
engines of economic growth in many countries in the world, particularly emerging markets. The 
idea behind this book is to explore four main issues regarding Greenfield FDIs. First, to explore 
basic facts and figures, and to provide some basic information on Greenfield FDIs overall, as well 
as regional and in Serbia. Second, to explore direct effects of Greenfield FDIs on economic and 
productivity growth. Third, to explore indirect (spillover) effects of Greenfield FDIs on economic 
and productivity growth. Finally, to explore preconditions for Greenfield FDIs in terms of public 
policies and institutions of the recipient country. We are grateful to Vip mobile d.o.o. who has 
encouraged and supported this research. Needless to say, the opinions expressed in this book are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Vip mobile d.o.o.
 
Belgrade, June 10th, 2008
Boris Begović
Boško Mijatović
Marko Paunović
Danica Popović
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11 Chapter I: FDIs and Greenfield FDIs: some basic facts and figures
1. Evolution of FDI flows in the world
After four consecutive years of rapid growth, FDIs in 2007 grew 10% and reached the 2001 
record of USD1.4 trillion. The immense fall in FDIs can primarily attributed to the recession 
in the US economy, which almost halved FDI inflows into developed countries and emerging 
economies of developing Asia and Latin America. Transition economies skipped the fall and 
recorded growth of 56% in 2006, reaching 5% of total FDI inflows in 2007.
United States recovered its position of the largest single host country for FDI in the world, with 
17% of total FDI inflows. European Union (EU 25) accounted for 45% of total FDI inflows in 2006, 
while Japan recorded negative net inflows for the first time since 1989. China and Hong Kong 
(with 6% and 3.2% of total world FDI inflows, respectively) remain the leading destinations in 
Developing Asia. India also saw record inflows as well, but with 1.6% of total FDI inflows, remains 
to seriously lag behind previous two Asian competitors.  New EU members – Hungary, Poland and 
Figure 1   Foreign direct investments by region, 1980–2011
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Source: UNCTAD Investment Brief, November 2007 and EIU, 2007.
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Table 2   Greenfield (new) FDI projects in the world, top recipient countries 2005-2006
2005
number of 
projects
share in world 
total (%) 
2006
number of 
projects
share in world 
total (%) 
% change, 
year on year 
china 1,237 11.84 1,378 11.66 11.4 
india 590 5.65 979 8.29 65.9 
Us 563 5.39 725 6.14 28.8 
UK 633 6.06 668 5.65 5.5 
france 489 4.68 582 4.93 19.0 
russia 511 4.89 386 3.27 -24.5 
romania 261 2.50 362 3.06 38.7 
Germany 271 2.59 333 2.82 22.9 
Poland 271 2.59 324 2.74 19.6 
bulgaria 140 1.34 286 2.42 104.3 
Source: LOCOmonitor Monthly Investment Monitor Global (MIM) edition, 2007. 
Table 1   Growth of FDI inflows, 2001-2011
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
% change, 
 year on year
-41 -25 -8.8 29.6 33.1 37.4 10.5 -4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4
Source: EIU, 2007.
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Czech Republic keep continuously attracting USD 22-28 billion of FDIs, interchanging positions 
amongst each other (tables  with details  on FDI flows are in the Tables A1-A6 to this chapter).
Although this was the fourth consecutive year of impressive growth of FDI flows— reaching 
over 30% annual growth in nominal US dollars, a caveat remains in   weakening of US dollar, 
which had dramatically boosted the nominal US dollar-denominated totals. But despite the 
recovery in 2004-07, when measured as a percentage of the world’s GDP, FDI inflows remain 
below 3% of world GDP in 2007, still  considerably lower than their peak of 4% share in GDP at 
the end of the previous decade.
After a long period of slow growth, FDIs structure by sector started to evolve since 2001, 
when primary sector FDIs started to grow from 2% in 2001 to 18% in 2006. These develop-
ments are primarily triggered by strong growth of Chinese economy and obviously sustainable 
rising demand for oil and gas in the medium term. But services remain the main destination 
of the FDIs in the world, although their share diminished from 74% to 54% of total invest-
ments. Financial services, telecommunications and real estate recorded highest and undisturbed 
growth throughout the whole period. When analyzed by industries, top ten industries comprised 
software & IT services (11% of all FDI projects), financial services (7.5%), food & tobacco (5.7%), 
business services (5.34%), communications (4.21%), etc.1
It is only when measured by the number of Greenfield investments that most dynamic 
economies of the world – China and India – come to the top of the list. Four transition economies, 
including Russia, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, are also listed in top ten recipient countries in 
the world, indicating the attractiveness of this region for investors.
Main destination of Greenfield investment are developing and transition economies, while 
M&A activities including cross border deals remain the main form of FDI in the developed world.2 
1 detailed data can be found in table a2 in the annex to this chapter.
2 “two main forms of fdi can be distinguished: Greenfield fdi is a new investment made by setting up a new 
foreign affiliate, while cross-border m&as involve a change in the control of assets and operations of the 
merged or acquired firm. in a cross-border merger the assets and operations of the two firms are combined to 
establish a new entity whose control resides in a team from one or both of the two. in a cross-border acquisition 
the control of assets and operations is transferred from one company to the other (foreign) company, 
the former becoming an affiliate of the acquirer. both firms may be private or state-owned: privatization 
involving a foreign investor counts as cross-border m&a” Unctad, tad/inf/Pr/055. a broader definition 
(of locomonitor) includes five main forms of fdi: Greenfield investment (a new operation), brownfield 
investment (expansions or re-investment in existing foreign affiliates or sites), mergers & acquisitions (m&as), 
Privatization and equity investment and new forms of investment (joint ventures, strategic alliances, licensing 
and other partnership agreements).
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Figure 2   Greenfield investments and constraints for FDIs
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Box 1 
Are Greenfield investments better than M&As?
It is commonly perceived nowadays that after only a few years of operation one 
cannot easily distinguish FDIs by mode of entry. UNCTAD World Investment 
Report suggests that, especially at the time of entry and in the short term, Greenfield 
investments involve, in some respects, greater benefits or smaller negative impacts 
from the perspective of host-country development.
Both modes of FDI entry bring foreign capital to a host country but financial 
resources provided through M&As do not always add to the capital stock, while in 
the case of Greenfield FDI they do. Hence a given amount of FDI through M&As may 
correspond to a smaller productive investment than the same amount of Greenfield 
FDI, or to none at all. However, when the only realistic alternative for a local firm 
is closure, cross-border merger or acquisition can serve as a “life preserver”.
FDI through M&As is less likely to transfer new or better technologies or skills 
than Greenfield FDI, at least at the time of entry. M&As may lead directly to the 
downgrading or closure of local production or functional activities (e.g. R&D), or to 
their relocation in line with the acquirers’ corporate strategy.
FDI through M&As does not generate employment when it enters a country. It 
may lead to lay-offs, although in the case of a firm which would have gone bankrupt 
if it had not been acquired, it can also maintain employment. Greenfield FDI, by 
contrast, necessarily creates new employment at entry.
FDI through M&As can increase concentration and lead to anti-competitive results. It 
can also, however, prevent concentration from increasing when takeovers help preserve 
local firms that might otherwise have gone under. Greenfield FDI, by definition, increases 
the number of firms in existence and does not increase market concentration upon entry. 
Source: UNCTAD WIR 2000.
In the longer term many differences between the two modes diminish or 
disappear. M&As often tend to invest in production, just as Greenfield FDI does 
(brownfield), and in the transfer of new or better technology, especially after 
acquired firms go through restructuring. Differences between the two modes with 
regards to employment generation tend to diminish over time and depend more on 
the motivation for entry than on the mode of entry. Concerns remain in developed 
and developing countries particularly about the market power of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and potential anti-competitive implications of M&As.
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According to the EIU survey of multinational corporations (MNCs), Greenfield investments would 
continue to be their primary route for investment into emerging markets in the coming five years. 
M&As lag behind, and the share of those who cited M&As as the preferred mode of investing in 
emerging markets rose only slightly for 2007-11 plans compared with the situation in the 
previous five-year period.
The forecasts of FDI growth indicate an overall slowdown and nominal decline in 2008 before 
renewed growth in 2009-11 increases annual FDI flows to USD 1.6trn. EIU survey of MNC 
respondents indicates that investors are willing to resume FDI activities in future. Over 40% MNCs 
reported expectations of a “substantial increase” of investments outside their home markets over 
the coming five-year period compared with the previous five years, and 52% said that they would 
increase their foreign investment “moderately”. Thus more than 90% expect their investments to 
increase; fewer than 1% of respondents expect to reduce substantially their foreign investments in 
2007-11.3  A widespread concern remains about political violence in leading countries such as the 
US and the UK, and apparent sensitivity to a range of geopolitical risks. But opportunities appear 
to predominate over political risk concerns, despite the fact that a considerably greater threat to 
business is foreseen over the next five years than in the recent past.4
3 economist intelligence Unit “World investment prospects to 2011 – foreign direct investment and the 
challenge of political risk”
4  ibidem.
Table 3   Foreign direct investment inflows in SEE, 2002-2011, (USD bn)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
bulgaria  0.9  2.1  3.5  3.9 5.2 3.5 2.3 2.3 2.4  2.5 
croatia  1.1   2.0 1.2 1.8  3.6 2.5 2.7 2.5  2.5  2.7 
Hungary  3.0  2.21 4.5  7.50 6.1 4.82 4.8  5.9  5.4 4.8 
romania  1.1  1.8 6.4 6.5 11.4 9.8 7.2 7.3 7.0 7.2 
russia  3.5  8.0 15.4 12.8 28.7 35.0 29.0 30.0 31.0 32.0 
serbia  0.5  1.4 1.0 1.5 4.3 2.2 3.5 2.0 1.9 2.0 
Source: EIU (2007), pp. 20 
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2. FDIs in transition economies of South Eastern Europe
Transition economies during past six years became a record FDI recipient with USD 112bn 
in 2006, making this region more competitive than Latin America, remaining second only 
to Asia among emerging markets. Among the ten emerging market FDI recipients in 2006 — 
three come from this region: Russia (3rd), Poland (8th) and Romania (10th). Total FDI inflows 
represented 5% of the region’s GDP, the highest ratio achieved thus far.  As for the Balkans, 
the FDI inflows/GDP ratio are even larger, exceeding 10% in 2006. This makes FDIs almost 
four times more intensive in this region than in the world, where average FDI/GDP ratio still 
did not exceed 2.5%.
Figure 3 indicates that a clear distinction can be made between four SEE countries (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Croatia and Serbia), on the one side, and the other four SEE countries (BIH, Albania, 
Macedonia and Montenegro), who attracted several times less abundant FDI flows. But in order 
to get a right insight, an inspection of stocks has to be made. When stocks are taken into account 
Figure 3   Foreign direct investments flows in selected SEE economies, mil. USD,
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(Figure 4) it becomes clear that fast Eastern-European reformers (Hungary, Poland and Czech 
Republic) attracted EUR 40-50 billion, while most successful late reformists (Slovakia, Romania 
and Bulgaria) attracted almost three times less investments. Croatia and Serbia are reaching EUR 
10 billion in 2006, but according to WIIW, foreign direct investments in southeastern Europe in 
2007 will retreat from last-year’s record-high levels.5
The estimates are that FDI inflows into the region of USD 112bn may have peaked in 2006. For 
2007 all regions except CIS are forecasted to decline, to a still very high USD 100bn. According 
to two distinguished FDI forecasters – The Economic Intelligence Unit and The Vienna Institute 
for International Economic Studies, total FDI inflows are likely to continue to trend downwards, 
even over the medium term. The main reason for this is the near-exhaustion of major privati-
zation opportunities in much of the region. But sharply increasing labor costs in many countries, 
continuing business environment problems and competition from other destinations threaten to 
keep inflows below potential for a number of years ahead. 
The experience of successful transition economies shows that Greenfield FDIs lag in the first 
phase of transition, primarily due to the fact that in the beginning of transition most countries 
opted for major privatizations – where cross-border M&As play a very useful role, which Greenfield 
FDI may not be able to play. The advantage of M&As in such conditions is that they restructure 
existing capacities that would otherwise risk downsizing or closure. In addition, it was only after 
major privatizations that hard budget constraint is implemented in the economy, which only 
then makes business environment attractive enough for foreign Greenfield investments. 
As a result of successful economic transformation transition economies are highly ranked in 
attracting Greenfield investments. Table 5 shows Romania ranking 7th on Greenfield projects 
worldwide with 362 Greenfield investment programs in 2006, followed by Poland, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, making transition economies practically one third of the most successful 
Greenfield locations in the world. Apart from Russia, where natural resources oriented Greenfield 
investments dominate, in other transition economies their structure is quite different. The 
relatively large size of these economies, the start of privatization by sale and the introduction of 
FDI-friendly policies proved as a successful means for attracting FDIs.
5   database on foreign direct investment in central, east and southeast europe, 2007: shift to the east
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Table 4   Sequencing of FDI during transition
 1990-1995 1996-2000 2000 onwards
czech r. liberalization, local market Privatization, little Greenfield Greenfield
Hungary liberalization, privatization Greenfield, export oriented Greenfield 
slovakia little liberalization, privatization Greenfield
Poland local market Privatization, local market Privatization, local market
serbia some privatization liberalization, privatization, 
some Greenfield
Source: WIIW, 2005, except for Serbia
After a surge in privatization-led FDIs, Greenfield investments are enjoying a resurgence in East-
Central Europe. Between 2002 and 2006, over 1000 Greenfield projects were started in regional 
leader Hungary, approaching the total of Brazil and surpassing those of several EU-15 countries 
(Spain, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal). Poland (709 project starts), Romania 
(635) and the Czech Republic (499) have also become important Greenfield destinations.6
As for the sectoral trends, in major transition economies manufacturing dominates inflows, while 
natural resources lead outflows. It is important here to distinguish market-seeking FDIs (local market-
oriented) from efficiency-seeking FDIs (export-oriented). In the first stage of FDI, market-seeking 
FDI prevailed. In the second half of the 1990s, more and more efficiency-seeking FDI emerged in 
manufacturing. At the same time market-seeking FDI expanded in financial and other business 
services. In the most recent years market-seeking FDI has been confined to newly liberalized utilities. 
Efficiency-seeking FDI has also appeared in market services. Manufacturing FDI developed from 
simple efficiency-seeking to a more complex network-type of integrated production.
Export-oriented FDIs in the CEECs is most densely located in countries close to the EU: Estonia, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, both because of the best transport facilities 
and low transaction costs, while maintaining relatively modest labor costs. Those countries are 
more advanced in terms of transformation, with efficient institutions and more advanced FDI 
policies than other transition countries can offer. Lately also Romania and Bulgaria joined the 
race for export-oriented FDIs.
6 fdi magazine, June 2007 and estimates from eiU for 2006.
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Table 5   Top 30 Greenfield locations in the world
2005 2006
no. share in world 
total (%)
no. share in world 
total (%)
% change, year 
on year
1. china 1,237 11.84 1,370 11.66 11.4
2. india 590 5.65 979 8.29 65.9
3. Us 563 5.39 725 6.14 28.8
4. UK 633 6.06 668 5.65 5.5
5. france 489 4.68 582 4.93 19.0
6. russia 511 4.89 386 3.27 -24.5
7. romania 261 2.50 362 3.06 38.7
8. Germany 271 2.59 333 2.82 22.9
9. Poland 271 2.59 324 2.74 19.6
10. bulgaria 140 1.34 286 2.42 104.3
11. Uae 226 2.16 282 2.39 24.8
12. spain 152 1.46 242 2.05 59.2
13. Hungary 206 1.97 235 1.9 14.1
14. vietnam 169 1.62 196 1.66 16.0
15. singapore 159 1.52 189 1.60 18.9
16. canada 206 1.97 177 1.50 -14.1
17. czech republic 149 1.43 174 1.47 16.8
18. mexico 137 1.31 170 1.44 24.1
19. Hong Kong 125 1.20 151 1.28 20.8
20. Japan 121 1.16 145 1.23 19.8
21. brazil 170 1.63 145 1.23 -14.7
22. ireland 193 1.85 140 1.19 -27.5
23. italy 140 1.34 138 1.17 -1.4
24. netherlands 109 1.04 129 1.09 18.3
25. australia 110 1.05 126 1.07 14.5
26. Ukraine 125 1.20 124 1.05 -0.8
27. malaysia
28. sweden
93
105
0.89
 1.01
123
120
1.04
1.02
32.3
14.3
29. slovakia 118 1.13 115 0.97 -2.5
30. thailand 117 1.12 111 0.94 -5.1
… serbia 4* 7* …. … …
* SIEPA
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Figure  4   Structure of investments in transition economies (average 2000-2006)
Hungary is ahead of the others concerning the amount invested, but this might change in the 
years to come due to new Greenfield investments in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, as well 
as newcomers to the EU, Bulgaria and Romania.
Numerous surveys are trying to estimate modes of entry for future FDIs. In general, most 
location experts7 expect firms to further internationalize their operations using both Greenfield 
operations and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (see Figure 6). An UNCTAD survey reveals that 
these two options receive a similar number of votes (about 40 per cent of the total) as the most 
likely mode of entry by TNCs. Other non-equity options such as licensing and strategic alliances 
were mentioned by only some 20 per cent of experts. Greenfield investments are seen as a major 
(42%) mode of FDI entry in Central and Eastern Europe. This is partly because major privatiza-
tions have already been performed, and also because efficiency-seeking investors are estimating 
good future for this region.
7  eiU, WiiW, Unctad, loco monitor, etc.
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Figure 5   Modes of investment: TNCs use different strategis for different regions (2004–2007)
In Central and Eastern Europe, FDI inflows are expected to increase in food and beverages, 
motor vehicles and other transport equipment and, to a lesser extent, publishing and media, 
printing and recording, and the electrical and electronics industries. The perception of improved 
prospects for FDI in the services sector is broad-based and includes industries such as construction 
and real estate, retail and wholesale trade, transport, education and health, business services, 
computer-related services, and banking and insurance.8 
8  Unctad Prospects for fdi flows, transnational corporation strategies and Promotion Policies: 2004–2007, 
and World investment Prospects to 2011. 
Source: UNCTAD-DITE, Global Investments Prospects Assessment (GIPA)
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3. FDIs and Greenfield FDIs in Serbia
Owing to a well-chosen privatization method Serbia is evidencing a growing FDI inflows since 
2000. The surge in 2006 coincided with peak FDIs in the whole region, and came primarily as a 
consequence of the privatization of the mobile telecommunications company Mobtel, purchased 
by Telenor for almost  EUR 1.513 million (slightly less than USD 1.9bn). 
Figure 6   FDIs in Serbia, 2000-2007, bn. USD
Source: National Bank of Serbia
 
The list of most abundant FDI flows by country of origin, sector and by mode of investments 
is given in Table 6, while Figure 8 gives a further insight in national shares of most important 
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Table 6   Most abundant FDIs in Serbia 
no. company country of 
origin
sector type of 
investment
sum 
(mil. eUr)
1 telenor norway telecomunications Privatization 1,513
2 mobilkom austria group austria telecomunications Greenfield 570
3 Philip morris – din Usa tobacco industry Privatization 518
4 stadt Germany industry capital market 475
5 banca intesa – delta banka italy banking capital market 462
6 interbrew – apatinska pivara belgium brewery capital market 430
7 nbG Greece banking Privatization 425
8 mercator slovenia retail Greenfield 240
9 lukoil – beopetrol russia oil industry Privatization 210
10 Holcim – novi Popovac switzerland cement Privatization 185
11 otP bank Hungary banking Privatization 166
12 alpha bank – Jubanka Greece banking Privatization 152
13 U. s. steel – sartid Usa steel and plate industry brownfield 150
14 metro cash & carry Germany Wholesale Greenfield 150
15 omv austria Gas stations Greenfield 150
16 coca cola Usa non-alcohol beverages capital market 142
17 africa israel corp. tidhar israel real estate capital market 120
18 droga Kolinska Grand prom. slovenia industry Greenfield 100
Source: SIEPA
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Table 7   FDI in Serbia in period 2000–1 VIII 2007, in USD and in %
no country thousands of Usd
2000 – 1 viii 2007
%
1 austria 1,658,234 19
2 norway 1,550,214 17
3 Greece 1,451,978 16
4 Germany 1,361,833 15
5 netherlands 476,784 5
6 slovenia 439,660 5
7 france 413,655 5
8 luxembourg 374,428 4
9 Hungary 311,877 4
10 Great britain 273,408 3
others 581,994 7
total 8,894,065 100
But many obstacles remain for more abundant FDIs to come to Serbia. According to Foreign 
Investors Council, the investors are mainly concerned with public sector salary increases, which 
might aggravate the pressure on inflation and ingrained corruption, as well as the still unreformed 
judiciary. Serbia’s “socialist” labor laws are overly protective of workers and do not stimulate job 
creation. In addition, the current system of rental of construction land hinders the establishment 
of capital funds. Real estate market also suffers from the procedure for issuing construction 
permits, which remains undefined. The Council has put forward several concrete recommenda-
tions. Efforts need to be increased in terms of copyright protection and the curbing of piracy. 
The already drafted law on takeovers needs to be adopted. Finally, restitution of property seized 
under communism is a precondition for fair relations in the real-estate sector – the backbone of 
the whole economy.9
9  fic report, 2007.
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Table 8
No. Company Country of 
origin
Sector Investment 
type
Sum 
(mil. EUR)
1 merkur slovenia retail Greenfield 60
2 ball corporation Usa Packaging Greenfield 60
3 Gtc international netherlands real estate Greenfield 58
4 Hellenic Petroleum Greece energy Greenfield 50
5 veropulos Greece retail Greenfield 34
6 laiki bank – centrobanka cyprus banking capital market 33
7 neochimiki – rafinerija nafte beograd Greece energy Privatization 31
8 General Group – delta osiguranje italy insurance capital market 30
9 Grawe austria insurance Greenfield 30
10 Hotel in Greece tourism Greenfield 20
Source: SIEPA
fdi cumulative per capita          fdi/GdP
Figure 7   Total FDI per capita and share in GDP
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Thus Greenfield investments such as the American Ball Packaging and the Microsoft Development 
Centre or Vip mobile remain an exception. 
When FDI stock is concerned, it becomes obvious that it still is very low – making only a half of FDIs 
per capita in Croatia and remaining several times lower than in more advanced transition economies. 
Concerns about present FDI inflows remain also because investments mainly entered by the 
nontradables sectors – banking, insurance, energy, telecom, real estate and retailing. From the 
growth perspective, the most sustainable are FDI flows that boost productivity and techno-
logical upgrading, especially in the tradables sector, as they boost competitiveness and exports. 
Nontradables sector inflows can be more worrisome—while they may improve productivity, if 
they do not generate foreign currency earnings. Large inflows to nontradables sectors, especially 
into real estate, have often led to credit booms, rising asset prices and wages, and to additional 
shifts in production from the tradables to the nontradables sector. With rising demand for 
imports and a declining supply of tradables, current account deficits can continue to widen. 
In that respects, Serbia remains a country with smallest share of tradables, which should be a 
serious warning to economic policy makers when analyzing results of recent FDI.
Table 9   Emerging Europe: Share of FDI in Tradables
Percent, stock, 2005 or latest available
Bulgaria Romania Croatia Serbia CEES Baltics
tradables (manufacturing and mining) 22 46 36 20 42 10
nontradables 78 54 64 80 58 80
trade 13 15 8 23 14 14
transport 26 12 16 0 7 9
financial interm. 20 11 28 37 18 27
real estate 9 6 2 12 11 15
Sources: WIIW, NBS
Empirical studies have shown that growth tends to be more sustainable in countries 
with strongly performing tradables sectors.10 Ireland is an example in Europe of rapid and 
sustainable catch-up with large capital inflows, in particular FDI, that boosted export production. 
10 Johnson and others (2006), rodrik (2006), and Jones and olken (2005)),
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Portugal, on the other hand, is an example of stalled catch-up, with large inflows of capital into 
consumption and investments in nontradables, including real estate. The widening current account 
deficit became unsustainable as competitiveness was lost following real exchange rate appreci-
ation, and the boom turned bust as growth slowed down (Box 2).
Box 2  
Catch-Up: The Different Experiences of Ireland and Portugal
Ireland and Portugal offer an interest-
ing contrast on the sustainability of 
catch-up.
Between the mid-1980s and euro adop-
tion in 2000, both Ireland and Portugal 
were catching up. From 2000 on, however, 
Ireland continued to catch up, while Portu-
gal started to revert.
The main differences are in wage pol-
icy and the use of the capital inflows.
In Ireland, large FDI flows into the 
manufacturing sectorcontributed to 
a sharp increase of the tradables sec-
tor, anexport boom, and a rapid rise of 
total factor productivity (TFP). As wages 
lagged TFP, the unit-labor-cost-based REER 
declined sharply, boosting profitability of 
the export sector and leading to a sharp 
increase in corporate saving. As government 
saving increased as well, the investment 
boom did not worsen the current account— 
on the contrary, savings increased faster 
than investment, and the current account 
balance moved into surplus.
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In Portugal, large capital inflows—in 
the nontradables sector rather than 
manufacturing—fed a domestic demand 
boom and a surge in imports. In the absence 
of a large presence of foreign firms, TFP growth 
lagged. As wage growth exceeded TFP, profit 
margins in the export sector were squeezed, 
stimulating a decline of the tradables sector. 
With little improvement in the government 
balance and a decline in corporate savings, 
total saving declined, widening the current 
account deficit.
In short, Ireland and Portugal had a 
different catch-up model. Ireland caught 
up through an expansion of supply and of the 
tradables sector; Portugal through expanding demand and of the nontradables sector.
The problem in Portugal arose when the boom came to a halt in 2001 and GDP stagnated. 
Labor productivity growth stopped, leading to a further deterioration of competitiveness, which 
maintained the current account deficit high. Portugal was in a slump but could not get out of it. 
With high and increasing fiscal deficits, and no independent monetary policy, there was no room 
to stimulate domestic demand. But the tradables sector had become too uncompetitive to drive 
the economy, yet with euro membership, exchange rate adjustment was no longer an option.
Why was Ireland so successful in attracting FDI in manufacturing? Both good policies and 
fortunate circumstances were important. Good policies included prudent fiscal policy, low taxes 
on labor and business income, and flexible labor and product markets. Fortunate circumstances 
included favorable demographics and participation in the EMU.
Source: IMF Working Paper, Vulnerabilities in Emerging Southeastern Europe—
How Much Cause for Concern? October 2007.
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Appendix
Table A1
Foreign direct investment projections
(USD bn unless otherwise indicated)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
World FDI inflows 618.1 563.4 730.2 971.7 1,335.1 1,474.7 1,406.4 1,470.3 1,536.8 1,604.0
% change, year on year -27.4 -8.8 29.6 33.1 37.4 10.5 -4.6 4.5 4.5 4.4 
% of GDP 1.9 1.5 1.8 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 
FDI inflows to 
developed countries 421.1 354.6 379.5 546.8 824.4 940.2 879.0 925.5 972.6 1017.3 
% change, year on year -25.2 -15.8 7.0 44.1 50.7 14.0 -6.5 5.3 5.1 4.6 
% of GDP 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 
% of world total 68.1 62.9 52.0 56.3 61.7 63.8 62.5 62.9 63.3 63.4 
FDI inflows to 
emerging markets 197.0 208.9 350.7 424.9 510.7 534.6 527.4 544.8 564.2 586.7 
% change, year on year -31.5 6.0 67.9 21.1 20.2 4.7 -1.3 3.3 3.6 4.0 
% of GDP 2.5 2.4 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 
% of world total 31.9 37.1 48.0 43.7 38.3 36.2 37.5 37.1 36.7 36.6 
World stock of inward 
FDI 7,185 8,615 9,981 10,455 12,216 13,622 14,955 16,347 17,796 19,307 
% change, year on year 11.4 19.9 15.9 4.7 16.9 11.5 9.8 9.3 8.9 8.5 
% of GDP 22.1 23.6 24.3 23.6 25.6 25.9 26.5 27.4 28.3 29.0 
Developed country 
stock of inward FDI  5,151 6,246 7,189 7,265 8,510 9,441 10,306 11,216 12,171 13,169 
% change, year on year 20.7 21.2 15.1 1.1 17.1 10.9 9.2 8.8 8.5 8.2 
% of GDP 20.6 22.2 23.0 22.3 24.9 25.6 26.4 27.8 29.2 30.4 
% of world total 71.7 72.5 72.0 69.5 69.7 69.3 68.9 68.6 68.4 68.2 
Emerging markets 
stock of inward FDI 2,034 2,369 2,792 3,189 3,706 4,181 4,649 5,130 5,626 6,139 
% change, year on year -6.8 16.5 17.9 14.2 16.2 12.8 11.2 10.4 9.7 9.1 
% of GDP 26.2 27.1 27.2 26.3 26.3 25.7 25.6 25.7 25.6 25.3 
% of world total 28.3 27.5 28.0 30.5 30.3 30.7 31.1 31.4 31.6 31.8
Sources: National statistics; IMF; OECD; UNCTAD; all forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit.
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Figure A1   Global FDI inflows, top 20 host economies, 2005-2006a (billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007 
Note: a Ranked by the magnitude of 2006 FDI outflows
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Figure A2   Global FDI outflows, top 20 investors, 2005-2006a (billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2007 
Note: a Ranked by the magnitude of 2006 FDI outflows
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Table A2   Number of FDI projects by sector
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003-06 total % of total 
software & it services 937 1,189 1,197 1,264 4,587 10.93
financial services 633 641 787 1,094 3,155 7.52 
food & tobacco 571 623 598 623 2,415 5.76 
business services 414 543 559 725 2,241 5.34 
textiles 421 590 410 498 1,919 4.57 
consumer products 396 431 404 585 1,816 4.33 
metals 433 371 540 441 1,785 4.25 
communications 338 361 521 548 1,768 4.21 
industrial machinery, equipment & tools 318 399 422 498 1,637 3.90 
chemicals 438 416 314 370 1,538 3.67 
automotive components 381 404 348 359 1,492 3.56 
real estate 238 229 263 495 1,225 2.92 
automotive oem 354 337 316 308 1,315 3.13 
electronic components 266 315 353 344 1,278 3.05 
coal, oil & gas 436 257 328 278 1,299 3.10 
transportation 176 264 362 379 1,181 2.82 
Hotels & tourism 305 288 265 293 1,151 2.74 
Plastics 224 230 233 262 949 2.26 
consumer electronics 250 229 238 194 911 2.17 
semiconductors 218 247 183 222 870 2.07 
Pharmaceuticals 208 204 199 192 803 1.91 
leisure & entertainment 212 186 129 173 700 1.67 
building & construction materials 130 145 156 186 617 1.47 
business machines & equipment 129 178 175 146 628 1.50 
Warehousing & storage 112 154 152 181 599 1.43 
Paper, printing & packaging 133 130 126 116 505 1.20 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2003-06 total % of total 
beverages 139 157 95 122 513 1.22 
aerospace 89 102 112 139 442 1.05 
alternative/renewable energy 48 41 75 168 332 0.79 
medical devices 82 90 91 127 390 0.93 
Wood products 105 96 100 74 375 0.89 
biotechnology 46 68 74 79 267 0.64 
rubber 52 62 74 70 258 0.62 
engines & turbines 53 52 47 70 222 0.53 
non-automotive transport oem 41 56 49 55 201 0.48 
Healthcare 49 47 37 51 184 0.44 
ceramics & glass 38 41 36 32 147 0.35 
minerals 36 27 50 22 135 0.32 
space & defence 18 25 27 31 101 0.24 
overall total. 9,467 10,225 10,445 11,814 41,951 100.00 
Source: LOCOmonitor
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Table A3   Overview of FDI in Central, East and Southeast Europe
FDI inflow, EUR million Per capita Per capita
forecast inflow EUR stock EUR
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2006 2006
czech republic 5404 6295 9012 1863 4007 9374 4752 5000 463 5719
Hungary 2998 4391 3185 1888 3633 6099 4874 4000 484 6170
Poland 10334 6372 4371 4067 10292 7703 11093 12000 291 2361
slovakia 2089 1768 4397 1914 2441 1694 3324 3000 617 3338
slovenia 149 412 1722 271 665 445 303 400 151 3133
New Member States 5 20974 19240 22687 10002 21039 25315 24346 24400 370 3571
estonia 425 603 307 822 776 2349 1282 1300 964 9232
latvia 447 147 269 270 513 582 1303 1300 589 2615
lithuania 412 499 772 160 623 826 1426 1300 420 2462
New Member States 8 22258 20439 24035 13795 22950 29072 28357 28300 389 3590
bulgaria 1103 903 980 1851 2736 3103 4104 4000 583 2047
romania 1147 1294 1212 1946 5183 5213 9082 7000 421 1432
New Member States 10 24508 22685 26226 15051 30869 37387 41544 39300 407 3019
albania 155 232 143 158 278 224 259 300 82 603
bosnia and Herzegovina 159 133 282 338 534 421 338 400 88 676 
croatia 1138 1502 1197 1785 990 1425 2838 2500 639 4577
macedonia 189 493 83 84 126 80 279 200 137 1028
serbia 55 184 504 1204 777 1265 3504 3500 471 1119
montenegro - 5 76 44 53 393 644 600 1031 1943
Southeast Europe 1696 2549 2285 3612 2759 3808 7862 7500 365 1683
belarus 129 107 262 152 132 245 282 300 29 214
moldova 138 115 89 65 120 160 177 200 45 250
russia 2933 3069 3660 7041 12422 10258 23047 25000 162 1150
Ukraine 644 884 734 1260 1380 6263 4148 5000 89 370
european cis 3844 4175 4745 8518 14053 16926 27654 30500 136 914
Central and Eastern Europe 30048 29409 33255 27180 47682 58121 77060 77300 236 1625
Source: wiiw database on FDI 2007 and wiiw forecast. 
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Table A4   Foreign direct investment inflows into eastern Europe
2006 
(Usd bn)
2007-11 av 
(Usd bn) % of regional total
East-central Europe 31.2 26.4 27.2
czech republic 6.0 5.4 5.6
Hungary 6.1 5.1 5.3
Poland 14.5 12.6 13.0
slovakia 4.2 2.2 2.3
slovenia 0.4 1.0 1.1
Balkans 27.1 18.1 18.7
albania 0.3 0.5 0.5
bosnia and Hercegovina 0.4 1.1 1.1
bulgaria 5.2 2.6 2.7
croatia 3.6 2.6 2.7
macedonia 0.4 0.4 0.4
montenegro 0.6 0.5 0.5
romania 11.4 7.7 8.0
serbia 5.6 2.8 2.9
Baltics 5.0 3.6 3.8
estonia 1.6 1.4 1.4
latvia 1.6 1.0 1.1
lithuania 1.8 1.2 1.3
CIS 42.2 48.7 50.3
russia 28.7 31.4 32.4
Ukraine 5.2 4.9 5.1
belarus 0.4 1.0 1.1
moldova 0.2 0.3 0.3
armenia 0.3 0.4 0.4
azerbaijan -0.7 1.6 1.7
Georgia 1.0 0.9 0.9
Kazakhstan 6.1 6.7 7.0
Kyrgyz republic 0.1 0.2 0.2
tajikistan 0.3 0.4 0.4
turkmenistan 0.3 0.4 0.4
Uzbekistan 0.3 0.4 0.4
East Europe total 105.9 96.8 100.0
Source: World Investments Prospects to 2011.
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1. The effects of Greenfield FDIs on economic growth
While it is generally accepted that a firm correlation exists between the speed of economic 
growth and the inflow of FDIs, the direction of causality is not clear: a link between the two 
phenomena is proved, but the direction in which it works is not all that clear.  It is intuitively 
clear, on the other hand, that Greenfield investments affect growth differently than other FDIs. 
Since Greenfield FDIs involve mainly (although not only) new capital assets, while privatizations 
and M&As are just transfers of existing ones, Greenfield FDI would seem more likely to affect 
growth - if at all – via increased physical investment, while M&A FDI would be more likely to 
do so via enhanced productivity growth. In fact, the increased importance of M&A in total FDI 
flows in recent years has been singled out as the likely cause of an observed weakening in the 
empirical FDI investment link in the 1990s (World Bank, 2001. “Global Development Finance 
2001”. Washington, D. C., 2001).  
Figure 1    Relationship between FDI inflows as a share of GDP and per capita GDP growth 
(average 1995–2004, in %)
  y = 0.2839 x + 2.567
r2 = 0.2363
1995–2004 GdP
linear (1995–2004 GdP)
0 5 10 15 
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
40Greenfield Foreign Direct Investments in Serbia
Figures 1 and 2 indicate that Greenfield inflows affect growth more strongly than overall 
investments1. Figure 1 shows a relation between total FDIs and per capita growth rate. It shows 
that FDI has a positive and significant impact − at the 8% level − on per capita GDP growth rate: 
a 1% point increase of FDI inflows in GDP accounts for an increase of 0.3% point of per capita 
GDP growth. As FDI contributes to investments (GFCF, i.e. gross fixed capital formation) to the 
extent to which it does not consist of acquisition of existing assets, brownfield FDIs have been 
deduced (proxy by the sales of existing companies to foreign investors) from FDI inflows to 
obtain a measure of Greenfield FDI. In that case, FDI has a larger positive and significant impact 
− at the 3 % level − on per capita GDP growth rate: a 1% point increase of FDI inflows in GDP 
accounts for an increase of 0.42% point of per capita GDP growth. 
Two questions of importance remain. The first one is about the continuation of the FDI boom 
to developing countries; specifically, would it continue after the privatization process and the 
ensuing expansion of cross-border M&A had dried up? That is, would investment in new assets 
follow an increase in cross-border M&A (the purchase of existing assets)? Table 1 indicates that 
an expansion of M&A is indeed followed by an increase in Greenfield FDI. 
1  sandrine levasseur, Convergence and FDI in an enlarged EU: What can we learn from the 
experience of Cohesion countries for the CEECs? research department, ofce-Paris, 2004.
Figure 2   Relationship between Greenfield FDI inflows as a share of GDP growth rate
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Table 1   Stylized facts on growth and FDIs
Summary of Results
industrial countries developing countries latin america
from Greenfield fdi to m&as - + -
from m&as to Greenfield fdi + + +
from Greenfield fdi to domestic investment + + +
from domestic investment to Greenfield fdi - - -
from m&as to domestic investment + + +
from domestic investment to m&as - - -
from Greenfield fdi to economic Growth - - -
from economic Growth to Greenfield fdi + + +
from m&as to economic Growth - - -
from economic Growth to m&as + + +
According to estimates, an increase in M&A by 1 % of GDP leads to a rise in Greenfield FDI by 
about 1 and 1.5 percentage points of GDP in industrial and developing countries, respectively. 
That is, the subsequent expansion of Greenfield FDI is at least as large as the initial increase in 
M&A, and substantially more in developing economies. Therefore, if the experience of the 1990s 
and late 1980s is a good predictor for the future, an expansion of Greenfield FDI will ensure 
that the FDI boom will continue in the future even after the privatization process has stopped.2 
Experiences of most advanced transition economies fully confirm this numerical result.
The second question concerns the causality (in the sense of time precedence) between the two 
forms of FDI and domestic investment and economic growth. The results were that both Greenfield 
and M&A FDI lead domestic investment but are led by GDP growth. Therefore, economic growth, 
as the most important indicator of domestic rates of return, serves as an effective “pull” factor for 
foreign investment; and in turn, FDI helps increase domestic investment in future3. 
2 calderón, loayza, servén, Greenfield foreiGn direct investment and merGers and acQUisitions: 
feedbacK and macroeconomic effects*, World bank Policy research Working Paper 3192, January 2004
3 in order to close the virtuous circle between fdi, domestic investment, and growth, it would be necessary for 
investment to lead to economic growth. this important link is not empirically verified, whether as a reflection 
of poor-quality investment (Pritchett 2000) or the fact that economic growth depends on a multitude of 
factors that cannot be fully captured by developments in fdi or domestic investment (barro and sala-i-martin 
1995, 2000). one of the reasons is already mentioned, i.e., not all modes of investments raise capital, and 
hence no immediate effects on growth emerge. 
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Figure 3   Domestic Investments responds Positively to FDI
Note: Shaded area represents 95 percent confidence band.
Sources: Lane and Miles Farretti (2006): World Bank WDI Online database; author’ calculations. 
Figure 4   FDI Has Positive Effect on Both Savings and Investment
Sources: Lane and Miles Farretti (2006): World Bank WDI Online database; author’ calculations. 
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 The most extensive analysis4 on the impact of FDIs on economic growth for thirteen countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe over the whole transition period so far - from the fall of the 
Iron Curtain until now - shows that FDI indeed had a significant positive impact on the rate 
of economic growth. This also implies that countries which benefited from high FDI inflows 
attained higher growth rates than otherwise, and countries that were less successful in attracting 
FDI generated less growth than they might have. In other words, the outcome of the empirical 
investigation assigns FDI an important role as a growth determinant. Due to its partly endog-
enous character, FDI will therefore advance to a decisive policy variable, especially for the less 
developed countries in Central and Eastern Europe, in order to foster the transition process. 
The study shows that FDI accounted for about two thirds (2.4%-points) of the average annual 
growth rate (3.4%). The contributions were positive for all of the thirteen countries, assigning 
FDI a pivotal role as an engine of economic growth. By contrast, average contributions from 
domestic investment accounted for only 13% (0.4%-points) of the average annual growth rate.5 
4 neuhaus, 2006, the impact of fdi on economic Growth, springer verlag
5 the only exception is slovenia, which had a high per capita income but a low inward fdi stock. dropping slovenia 
from the sample improves the relationship between fdi and per capita income significantly. the correlation 
coefficient jumps to 0.49 and the ols regression turns out to be significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 5   Total productivity gains from FDI
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The results show that most of the countries were not able to reach higher sustainable domestic 
investment rates; in some countries the domestic investment rate even shrank. Combing the 
results for FDI and domestic investment yields some signs of a crowding-out of the domestic 
capital accumulation sector. 
Following the EC study on FDI and regional development, regardless of the type of FDI and 
regardless of the region groups, the long term effect from FDI induced productivity gains on 
labor demand are positive. 
2. The effects of Greenfield FDIs on employment 
The assertion that FDIs would automatically lead to a strong increase in production and 
employment can often be misleading, since it is not the level of FDI that matters, but the kind of 
FDI (see Table 2). Only Greenfield (both vertical and horizontal) investment turn out to create 
new employment in the short run, while other FDI modes operate as a buffer to reductions in 
overall employment, but show significant cross-country differences.
  
Table 2   The net effects of FDI on regional labour demand 
General encountered effect on 
regional labour demand*
(1) mergers & acquisitions -
Greenfield investments +
(2) Within-industry effect from fdi on local competitor’s labour demand - 
cross-industry effect from productivity knock-on effect +
(3) net regional effect +
 Source: Copenhagen Economics.
Note: *) Please note that the table only shows the general encountered effect based on a very large sample of regions 
and foreign investments, and that the result in specific regions can deviate from this general picture.
Source: The FDI – employment link in a globalizing world, Employment Strategy Dept, 2005.
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It is primarily the case because market-seeking investment is always an important motive for 
FDI but it does not help create much employment, mainly because of rationalization measures 
in capital-intensive and some service activities. The restructuring of former state-owned enter-
prises in the wake of privatization often meant massive labor shedding. However, recent liter-
ature shows that positive effects on employment growth in privatized firms arise in a range of 
three to six years after privatization. Experiences of more advanced transition economies are 
depicted in Table 2. 
Table 3   Directions of the change of number of employed persons 
in the foreign and domestic sectors, 1998–2001
total foreign domestic
estonia 0 + -
czech republic + + -
Hungary + + +
Poland - 0 -
slovak republic - + -
slovenia 0 + -
romania - + -
Source: wiiw Database on foreign investmententerprises relying on national sources
Regardless of the type of FDI the long term effect from the FDI induced productivity gains 
on labor demand are positive.6 A general increase in labor demand is evidenced within regions 
having many Greenfield investments. In addition, both M&As and Greenfield investments 
introduce more competition in the local industry and inefficient local firms are driven out. At 
the same time, productivity gains from both learning effects and from restructuring improves 
the competitiveness of the remaining industry and the increased demand from the rest of the 
economy drives up labor demand. FDI in most cases incorporated more modern technology than 
domestically available and also meant a rise in competitiveness.
The overall state of employment and problems with great unemployment is not a universal 
problem in all transition economies. Adding here the experience of Serbia, it becomes very 
6 Unctad, World investment report, 2007; european commission study on fdi and regional development, 
final report, directorate-General for regional Policy, dec. 2006
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visible that transition countries usually restricted growth in wages to the level of GDP growth 
and, with the exception of Poland, this policy had some success in curbing unemployment. In 
the case of Serbia, strong and persistent annual increase in wages of almost 20% in real terms 
have left a significant part of the workforce unemployed, while continuous rise in wages in the 
state owned companies makes work in the private sector less attractive. 
As demonstrated in Table 3, in almost all countries faster wage growth was “paid” by a higher 
unemployment rate.
Table 4   Growth in gross domestic product, productivity and real wages in transition countries, in%
productivity GdP wages unemployment rate
bulgaria 5.5 0.7 -6.6 12.7
czech republic 6.7 2.0 5.1 10.6
estonia … 2.5 4.8 11.0
Hungary 14.6 3.4 0.8 6.0
latvia … 0.9 4.8 11.0
lithuania … -1.7 3.1 13.2
Poland 11.3 6.0 6.8 17.9
romania 7.9 0.6 -2.2 6.3
slovakia 5.8 4.2 1.6 15.6
slovenia 8.0 4.8 4.9 8.0
serbia 5.5 4.7 19.8 21.0
Productivity and GDP from Galgoczi, unemployment from Bishop, K (2001)
Transition economies (especially Poland) have experienced that a policy of delaying privati-
zation or imposing employment requirements on the new owners is likely to mitigate the loss of 
jobs only temporarily and even then only under favorable circumstances. 
The range of potential effects on employment can be then summarized as follows. 
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The effects of FDI on wages are generally positive, as TNCs as a whole pay higher wages 
than local employers. Although data specific to developing-country TNCs are limited, indirect 
evidence suggests that, at least for skilled labor, they offer higher wages than host-country 
domestic firms. 
In addition to these potential effects, which in principle apply to all kinds of private capital 
inflows, the gains to host countries from FDI can take several other forms: 
FDI allows the transfer of technology—particularly in the form of new varieties of capital •	
inputs—that cannot be achieved through financial investments or trade in goods and 
services. FDI can also promote competition in the domestic input market. 
Box 1 
Direct and indirect effects of FDI on host-country employment 
Direct effects:
– Job loss through restructuring of privatized, formerly inefficient state-owned companies.
The need for such restructuring was obvious, but reducing the adverse effect on employment 
has also been an objective of policymakers. Delaying privatization or imposing employment 
requirements on the new owner could only temporarily and under favorable circumstances mitigate 
the loss of workplaces.
– Job creation through Greenfield investment. This has been the main hope of the EU new member 
states and most of the FDI policy has actually targeted such investments in the manufacturing 
sector. These hopes have only partially materialized. Most of the Greenfield jobs have been created 
in the services sector such as banking, retail and real estate.
Indirect effects:
– Job destruction by cutting former domestic linkages after the foreign takeover of a former 
state-owned enterprise. Foreign investors replace traditional domestic suppliers with imports, 
generating negative spillovers. 
– Job destruction in the domestic SME sector through the competition of larger and technologically 
more advanced subsidiaries of MNCs. For instance, super-market chains drove out small shops and 
their suppliers. 
Source: Hunya, Geishecker Employment Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in Central and 
Eastern Europe, WIIW Research Reports
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Recipients of FDI often gain employee training in the course of operating the new •	
businesses, which contributes to human capital development in the host country. 
Profits generated by FDI contribute to corporate tax revenues in the host country. •	
Of course, countries often choose to forgo some of this revenue when they cut corporate tax 
rates in an attempt to attract FDI from other locations.
Table 5   The range of potential effects 
Direct Indirect
area of impact Positive negative Positive negative
Quantity adds to net capital 
and creates jobs in 
expanding industries.
foreign direct 
investment through 
acquisition may result 
in rationalization and 
job loss.
creates jobs through 
forward and backward 
linkages and 
multiplier effects in 
local economy.
reliance on imports 
or displacement of 
existing firms results 
in job loss.
Quality Pays highes wages 
and has higher 
productivity.
introduces practices 
in, e g, hiring and 
promotion that 
are considered 
undesirable.
spill-over of ‘best 
practice’ work 
organization to 
domestic firms.
erodes wage levels as 
domestic firms try to 
compete.
location adds new and 
perhaps better jobs 
to areas with high 
unemployment.
crowds already 
congested urban 
areas and worsens 
regional imbalances. 
encourages migration 
of supplier firms to 
areas with available 
labor supply.
displaces local 
producers, adding 
to regional 
unemployment, if 
foreign affiliates 
substitute for local 
production or rely on 
imports.
Source: UNCTAD (1994)
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3. The effects of Greenfield FDIs on exports 
Depending on the type of FDIs, whether it is market or efficiency seeking, FDIs can become 
successful exporters. The case of Hungary is presented in Table 5, where eight out of ten largest 
exporters are Greenfield investments, with export share in sales of over 80%.
Table 6   Greenfield exporters in Hungary
company With foreign participation? export / sales
1 audi Yes (Greenfield) 99
2 flextronics international Yes (Greenfield) 99
3 Philips Hungary Yes (Greenfield) 98
4 Ge Hungary Yes (privatization) 94
5 mol Partly (publicity traded) 23
6 ibm storage Products Yes (Greenfield) 100
7 open Hungary Yes (Greenfield) 100
8 samsung electronics Yes (Greenfield) 82
9 borsodchem Partly (publicity traded) 81
10 nabi Yes (Greenfield) 99
Note: only those companies included which provided data on their activities (Nokia!)
Serbia, unfortunately, does not share the experiences of Hungary or Ireland, where Greenfield 
investors Intel, Dell, Pfizer and HP make up almost 90% of Irish exports. 
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Figure 6   Major export products in 2006 (mil. USD)
Still, brownfield investor US Steel represents the largest Serbian exporter so far. Other investors, 
like Greenfield Ball Packaging, have been extremely successful, but this is unfortunately almost 
the only case of an efficiency-seeking FDI in Serbia. Most FDIs in Serbia are market-seeking and 
belong to the non-tradable sector. Still, most of them are extremely important for improving 
the Serbian business environment – from telecommunications (Telenor, Vip) to a whole set of 
FDIs in banking, insurance, and retail. Not only do they raise competitiveness, but they also 
create an environment which can then become more attractive to efficiency-seeking FDIs. Such 
efficiency-seeking FDIs are essential for the economic stability of the country, since they help in 
avoiding balance of payments overheating, which has recently become a serious problem of the 
Serbian economy. 
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Box 2 
About U. S. Steel Serbia, d.o.o and Affiliated Companies
On September 12, 2003, United States Steel Corporation purchased the Serbian steel company, Sartid, 
a.d., out of bankruptcy. Sartid steel company operated well below its rated 2.2 million metric ton 
capacity. The operations had been badly neglected with insufficient investment in the machinery 
and infrastructure. 
The operations and their more than 9,000 workers basically survived on limited state assistance 
aimed at preventing collapse of the company and the social unrest likely to ensue with the collapse of 
one of Serbia’s largest companies. During the following ten months, U. S. Steel managed the operations, 
paying the monthly costs of employee salaries, raw materials charges, utility and railway bills. The 
managing agreements prevented the collapse of the company and economic devastation in the region. 
 
 
Thus, U. S. Steel became one of the leading investors in Serbia. During its first year of ownership, 
U. S. Steel Serbia, d.o.o. has made a series of capital investments including: 
a USD 3.2 million rehabilitation and startup of the K-3 steel producing converter, idle for •	
more than 13 years
The greatest exporters in Serbia 2007
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mistry
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complex
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4. Risks
FDI can also bring risks to a host developing country. The literature indicates some cases were 
FDIs have been the target of criticism for “direct harms”— such as pollution and natural resource 
degradation. However, no connection was found between environmental index and share of FDIs 
in GDP, indicating that pollution can emerge both in the presence and absence of FDIs. 
Risks stem from the possibilities that FDI will 
lower, rather than raise, domestic savings and investment, including negative effects to •	
GNP via profit repatriation; 
“crowd out” domestic companies from capital markets; •	
increase demands for foreign exchange; •	
support local oligopolies and be anticompetitive; •	
distort local politics and thwart regulation; •	
create instability through increasing financial volatility; •	
purchase of a USD 2.3 million tension leveler system for enhancing output and quality of •	
tinplate products at the Sabac plant
a USD 10.5 million project upgrading electronic controls on the Smederevo Plant’s cold •	
reduction sheet products line
In September, 2004, the company announced it would invest more than USD 38 million in 
projects to advance the Smederevo Plant’s production to its rated raw steel capability of 2.2 million 
metric tons. The projects include: 
rebuilding the plant’s No. 1 blast furnace, idle since 1987•	
improvements in the basic oxygen steel producing shop to enlarge furnace heat sizes from •	
92 to 112 tons per batch, a 20 percent increase in output
modernization of the plant’s two continuous casting machines with installation of variable •	
width casting molds. 
 
In December 2005 – The Serbian Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SIEPA) named U.S 
Steel Serbia the top exporter of the year. Also, this position is held in 2006 and 2007.
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seek to protect technology rents rather than transfer technology, reducing or eliminating •	
hoped-for spillovers and externalities. 
Most studies over the past decade have examined “net assessments” of the impact of FDI 
covering 183 projects in some 30 countries over the past 15 years and found “a clearly positive 
impact on the economic welfare of the host”. Also, macroeconomic country studies generally 
have found a positive impact of FDIs. An IMF study found evidence of positive effects, including 
productivity increases through technology transfer, to be “overwhelming. Several studies 
indicated that, to capture the benefits of FDI, a country must already have reached some kind of 
“development threshold”. FDI is also proven to raise growth only in countries where the labor 
force has achieved a minimum level of education (Borensztein et al, 1998). 
Figure 7    FDI and the Environment
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1. What are spillover effects?
Direct effects of FDIs, both Greenfield and others are clearly visible. As it was demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, these effects are substantial in the area of growth of output and value 
added (contribution to the GDP growth), growth of employment, export and competitiveness 
growth and technological progress. Since the firms that are established by Greenfield FDIs 
are capturing these results, investors are in position to capture these results in their increased 
total revenues, decreased operational costs and, ultimately, increased profit. Accordingly, these 
effects are direct effects of the Greenfield FDIs. Furthermore, direct effects are the effect to 
customers of the firms created by the Greenfield FDIs in terms of the new products, both goods 
and services, better quality-price combination, etc.      
But there are some effects that these firms and Greenfield foreign direct investors are not able 
to capture. These spillover effects of the Greenfield FDIs are those that affect not the firm that 
was created by the FDI, but other firms in the recipient country and, by that, all the customers, 
not only customers of the FDI’s firm. Since these effects are not able to be captured by the FDI 
created firm, there are considered as external effects or external economies.   
Theory of external economies gave a rather straightforward explanation of the existence 
of such economies. The economic theory specifies that external economies exists in the case of 
firms exist if the action of one economic agent (firm) affects the productivity and/or costs level 
of the other (firms) and that this action is not sanctioned by the market, hence no price has been 
charged/paid for that. Unfortunately, most of the external economies that are considered today 
in public debate are actually external diseconomies, since one economic agent inflicts additional 
costs to the other. Typical external diseconomies are associated with pollution, i.e. environ-
mental damage that increases costs of production of all the firms that are affected by that kind 
of environmental external diseconomies. There are two features of all the external economies 
and diseconomies, and these can easily be recognized in the case of pollution. First, there is no 
voluntary exchange between the two sides: the one that creates the pollution and the one that 
receives the pollution. Otherwise, there would be a market price relate to the exchange. Second, 
the side who sustain the costs (loses) does not receive the compensation. Now the concept of 
external economies is clarified. 
Nonetheless, apart from external costs, there is a substantial number of external economies, 
i.e. external benefits to other firms. Usually these benefits are not as visible as external costs, so 
their media coverage is not so frequent. Typical external benefits can be spotted in any shopping 
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mall. Customers that come to visit one shop in the mall, have strong incentives to visit the 
all others. Opening of additional shop in the shopping mall increases the number of people/
customers that are visiting all other shops in that mall. The very concept of the shopping mall is 
based on the external benefits that shops are creating to each other.          
Crucial prerequisite for external economy to exist is that firms who are producing benefits to 
the others are not able to capture these benefits, i.e. to charge a full market price for them. If these 
benefits/effects are captured, than external economies are internalized: external economies are 
no more. But if they are not captured, if external economies exist, than the problem is that firms, 
because they can not capture the benefits, do not have incentives to produce these benefits, or 
not to produce them in sufficient quantity. That fact clears the way to discuss the possibility 
for government intervention, i.e. for government producing incentives for producing external 
benefits that market can not.    
2. Spillover effects: a simple taxonomy
In the case of FDIs external economies are usually labeled as “spillover” effects. Again, a crucial 
prerequisite for some effect to be classified as a spillover effect is that foreign direct investor 
cannot capture it, and to make it a part of his/her business calculation. These spillover effects are, 
in general, divided to intra-industry and inter-industry effects. Intra-industry spillover effects, 
sometime referred to as horizontal spillovers are those spillover effects that are beneficial only 
to the other firms that are in the same industry, whatever the industry is: telecommunications, 
banking, cement, etc. Firms in other industries are not affected by these spillovers. The important 
thing is to properly understand meaning of the word “beneficial”. For example, one of the inter-
industry spillovers is increasing of competition in the industry by enhancing competitive pressure. 
Someone can ask a question whether these effects are really beneficial for the competitors. In 
short term, it is definitely not. As Nobel Prize laureate John Hicks has pointed out “the sweetest 
of all monopoly profits is quiet life”. Hence, private as well as other firms do not like competition. 
In the long term, however, competition is beneficial even to them, because competition provides 
incentives for economic efficiency. Most of all, it provides incentives for productive efficiency. In 
the long run, only competition can provide competitiveness of the firms and competitiveness of the 
industry. Needless to say, the increased competition between the firms, i.e. producers/suppliers is 
beneficial to the customers. Hence not only the customers of the products that are produced by the 
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Greenfield FDIs, but all customers in the industry receives benefits of the increased competition 
due to, what economists are referring to as new entry, i.e. Greenfield FDIs. The mechanism of both 
causality links will be explained in details later in this chapter.    
Intra-industry spillover effects, i.e. vertical spillovers are these effects to the local firms in 
the all other industries and customers of their products. There are always direct vertical links 
between firms created by the Greenfield FDI and local firms: they could be both upstream and 
downstream. Upstream links means that Greenfield FDI created firm sells its products (good 
or services) to the local companies, like, for example, dealers/distributors, who then provide 
these products to the customers/consumers. Downstream links means that local companies are 
providing inputs to the FDI created firm. Spillover effects are not these that are captured by the 
FDI created company, but those captured by local companies and, eventually, transferred to all 
the customers. Upstream and downstream links underlines direct vertical contacts between FDI 
created firm and local firms as the background for spillover effects. Nonetheless, in some case 
there is no need for direct contact (being them horizontal or vertical) between these firms for 
spillover effects to take place. For example, FDI created firm can train an employee in their best 
business practice manner in some area that is common for all companies, irrespectively of the 
industry, like, for example, accounting. If that employee leaves his/her Greenfield FDI created 
job and gets another job in some other, completely unrelated local firm, that firms will, free of 
charge, gain his improved accounting skills. Of course, local firms pay these specialist market 
salary; nonetheless, local firm does not bear costs of the training of these specialists, i.e. they do 
not invest in creating in their human capital.  
3. Mechanism of spillover effects
The first spillover effect that is completely intra-industrial is increasing of competition: the 
more competition, the better. That statement is valid for almost everyone. It is definitely better 
to have more competition from the viewpoint of customers, and it is better for everyone else 
except idle, indolent and slack employees’ and producers/firms: they do not like competition and 
usual find very imaginative explanations why competition is not good for a society. 
Many people wrongly consider that number of competitors in the industry is the only 
indicator of the level of the competition in that industry. That is simply not true, though 
number of competitors is not entirely irrelevant. Competition is, according to the Nobel Prize 
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laureate George Stigler, predominantly rivalry between competitors, i.e. competitive pressure 
to one firm from all other firms in the industry. That rivalry/pressure provides incentives to 
every firm in the industry for economic efficiency: the only way for every firm to survive is to be 
efficient. The most important feature of economic efficiency in this case is so called productive 
efficiency that includes a several elements: development of new, better products, new ways 
to serve customers and decreasing costs and lower prices. The advent of Greenfield FDI based 
firms brings new competitive pressure in the industry: because of the well developed new 
products, improved ways to serve the customers and their costs efficiency, that is embodied in 
their lower prices. These features of the FDI based firms are due to their superior technology, 
as well as superior know-how based in their international background, already tested in 
many other countries of operations and adopted as the best practice. Accordingly, Greenfield 
FDI based firms brings on superior production process and by that substantialy increases 
competitive pressures to the local firms in their industry. That advent is far more that another 
local competitor, this is a competitor that makes a substantial impact to the incumbent firms, 
increasing competitive pressure. Sometimes this view is restricted to the idea that these new 
entries will break–up monopoly in some industry by introducing a few firms. It is far more 
that, because competition is about rivalry, not the number of competitors, and with the advent 
of the Greenfield FDIs, that pressures is based on modern technology, state-of-art know-how 
and worldwide tested best practice.
Box 1 
Measuring the competition
It is difficulty to measure competition, but some proxies can be used for that. One of the proxies is 
advertisement expenditures. The stiffer competition, the more advertisement expenditures. With 
the advent of Vip mobile in 2007 all mobile operators has increased advertising budgets several 
times in comparison with the previous year. The two incumbent mobile operators were ranked 
below 20th position in terms of advertisement expenditures and in 2007 now they are among 5 top 
companies according to the advertisement expenditures
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The other channel of competitive pressure that is created is a potential entry of the Greenfield 
FDI’s. If government policy is the one with low barrier to entry, particularly low legal barriers to 
entry, all incumbent firms are disciplined by a threat of potential, new entry of some Greenfield 
FDI. The best way to demonstrate that threat is that some FDIs Greenfield already have materi-
alized in the recipient country in a given industry. The best proof that something is possible is 
that it already exists. Accordingly, it is not only the competitive pressure of existing FDI based 
Greenfield, but also new entries of that kind that proved to be feasible by these that already 
entered the market. 
The other mechanism in which Greenfield FDIs increases is that they produce a new yardstick 
for other forms to measure their business operations. The point is that if local firms compete with 
each other or local monopoly exists and none of the firms have information about attainable/
feasible costs. Even if they have the best incentives for decreasing the operational costs to 
increase the profit, they do not have an appropriate information whether they are successful 
in their drive for costs cutting. This information function of the new entry is very important in 
the world of asymmetrical information. New entry of the Greenfield FDI provides a yardstick, 
or a benchmark for all local competitors and helps them, irrespectively of other mechanism of 
competitive pressure, to reduce their costs and to increase economic efficiency of production.     
Increased competition brought about by Greenfield FDIs produces substantial beneficial effects 
to all the customers of the considered industry. That competition brings about: new products, 
innovative ways to serve the customer, new marketing, and lower prices for the customers. In 
case of banking for example, such a Greenfield FDI induced competition brings about new types 
of loans (fast cash credits, for example), innovative and better ways of communication with 
customers in the process of extending this loan, new ways of marketing communication in which 
customers are informed about all relevant details regarding the product and can make their 
own rational choice about this product and its use, and finally due to increased competition 
and reduced costs, interest rates that customers are paying are going down (for a given risk 
of the loan). If the customers are not consumers, but producers, than these effects are multi-
plied, because increased competition due to the FDIs Greenfield investments enhances opera-
tions of other producers and could be beneficial for consumers of their products. For example, 
reduced tariff rates for mobile communications and increased quality of that communications 
have beneficial effects for both consumers and producers that are using these services as their 
production input. At the end of the day, consumers are, both directly and indirectly, reaping the 
benefits of increased competition.       
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It is estimated (Deloitte, 2008) that the new entries to the Serbian mobile telecommunication 
market (Telenor in 2006 and Vip mobile in 2007) made all Serbian customers (both commercial 
and residential) to benefit from a significant increase and diversification in the service offer and 
a fall in prices for 14%. Furthermore, the same report provides an estimate that the business 
usage of mobile telecommunication contributed to the increase in productivity of an individual 
worker by 7% in 2007. Modern ICT is indispensable for economic growth in era of modern, 
new economies. Increase competition due to new FDIs’ entries inevitably leads to the increased 
penetration rate. Competition of three mobile operators in Serbia produced penetration rate 
of about 90% of the population, standing at an estimated 72% when multiple SIM cards are 
accounted for (Deloitte, 2008). Such a penetration significantly decreases transaction costs of 
virtually any transaction, irrespective on which market. For a country with huge unemployment, 
it is crucial that better communications significantly reduces transaction costs at the labor 
market, increasing probability of new employment. Huge penetration rate of mobile commu-
nications made possible complete replacement of the cash payments for car parking in Serbian 
cities – widout widespread use of mobile communications, such a system is not effective. And 
all these contributions are due to the spillover effects due to increased competition between 
operators in mobile telecommunications industry.   
Imitation is very important channel of horizontal spillover effects – it is usually labeled as 
“classical” transmission mechanism for new products and processes. Apart from that, the same 
channel is a transmission mechanism for managerial/organizational innovations. In the case of 
new products imitation is based on “reverse engineering” and its success depends on product 
complexity – it is easier to imitate simple products. The problem of complexity in reverse 
engineering in the case of service industries is not so relevant, i.e. it is not as big obstacle as in the 
case of managerial/organizational innovations, which are much more transparent than patent 
protected innovative products/technologies. As these innovations like new tariff structure (see 
Box 2) and customer relations innovations are quite transparent to customers, they are also 
transparent to the local firms in the same industry, i.e. local competitors. The level of trans-
parency increases for products to services, hence imitation is very important in various services 
(telecommunications, retailing banking, insurance and other financial services, transportation 
etc.). Hence, in service industries imitation is one of the most important channels for intra-
industry spillovers.     
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FDI’s create very specific demand for inputs and in that way affects their local suppliers. In 
that sense vertical downstream links are basic channel for this type of vertical spillover effects 
(inter-industry spillovers). FDI’s in general and Greenfield FDIs specifically creates very specific 
demand, usually by much higher standards in terms of the quality of the inputs (requested 
materials, goods and services), quality of the services that are offered to the customer in terms, 
for example, of precise timing (just in time) of delivery, zero tolerance for contact breaching 
regarding the delivery, etc. These standards are usually much higher than the standards of local 
companies and that their requests to the local supplies. In other words, FDIs mean stiffening 
competition and competitive pressure on the local input markets with new demand require-
ments and pretty clear directions for all suppliers that would like to be successful. That creates 
incentives for local supplier to invest in increasing quality of their output and to restructure their 
operations to increase the quality of their services to the all customers, not only to the Greenfield 
FDI’s customers. Furthermore, Greenfield FDI usually provide some support to these suppliers 
in their efforts to meet these standards in terms of training, technical assistance, know-how 
transfer etc. In that sense, benefits of the restructuring and improved operation of local suppliers 
are disseminated to all other customers. When a local firm learns and starts to implement new 
standards of, say, production and delivery its products, these standards are enforced indiscrimi-
nately, irrespective of the customers. This kind of vertical spillover effects have impact on all the 
customers of the industry that is supplying Greenfield FDIs. The other customers are free riding 
on the efforts of the Greenfield FDIs to increase the standards of supplying inputs.       
Box 2 
24/7 dissemination 
Vip mobile as a Greenfield FDI in mobile telecommunications was the first to offer a new tariff 
package on the Serbian market: flat prepaid tariff for calls and SMSs to all networks 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week (24/7). That package was offered before Vip mobile started its operation. It is, no 
doubt, simple and most transparent tariff package offer that has not been offered at the Serbian 
market before. Two incumbent operators started the implementation of exactly the same tariff in 
mid May 2007, several days before Vip mobile started the operation.
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The same mechanisms of vertical spillovers exist in the case of vertical upstream links. Again 
increased competition, increased standards, followed by in terms of training, technical assistance, 
know-how transfer etc. In the case of telecom industry, the retailing of the telecom services is 
completely outsourced from the telecom operator to the local distributors/retailers. In the case 
of manufacturing of, for example, aluminum canes for beverages, which are supplied to the 
beverages’ producers, transportation and delivery of the products, are completely outsourced to 
local trucking industry. Modern economy is about outsourcing and focusing to the core business. 
That is exactly how companies built on Greenfield FDIs operate. Apart from purchasing inputs 
in terms of components and materials on the local market, they are outsourcing various services, 
like maintenance, security, transportation, advertising, IT services, accounting etc. Many of these 
services are outsourced to local companies and through this outsourcing vertical spillovers are 
created.
Empirical studies provided evidence that in some countries vertical spillovers are the most 
import group of spillover effects. In case of, for example, Lithuania (Javorcik, 2004) demon-
Box 3  
Vertical downstream/upstream  links
All three Greenfield FDIs in Serbia that were analyzed demonstrated very strong vertical down-
stream linkages with local firms. Vip mobile is purchasing construction works (masts for antennas) 
from domestic construction companies in the modern way that these companies are not used to. 
The same goes to the software that is purchased from the local software developers, i.e. local forms 
are used for developing these parts of the software that are specific for Serbian market. Raiffeisen 
bank developed long term relations with local software producers for developing specific banking 
software.    
As to the upstream links, Ball Packaging transportation/distribution is completely contracted-
out to local trucking industry. Loading of the product is completely regulated according to the Ball 
Packaging standards and each truck operator is obliged to purchase a GDP device that enables Ball 
Packaging to track down each shipment and its status in real time. Distribution/retailing of the Vip 
mobile services is contracted-out to local firms. These firms and their employees received the train-
ing from Vip mobile in terms of the know-how that is standardized on the corporate level. The new 
corporate standard improved the performance of the local distributors/vendors.
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strated that downstream vertical spillovers are the most important way in which FDIs affects 
local firms. It is considered that Lithuania is not specific regarding that. That is why it is demon-
strated that FDIs in natural resources sector or primary sectors are not so beneficial for domestic 
economy (Aykut and Sayek, 2007). Naturally, the possibilities for downstream vertical spillovers 
are very limited in these cases as the market for inputs to such firms is rather limited.    
Specific imitation based spillover effects is export spillovers. Basically, local firms can learn 
to export from the FDIs. The important point is that export generally involves fixed costs in 
terms of establishing distributional networks in specific country, creating transport operations 
capable of reaching another country, learning about consumers’ tastes in that country, specific 
regulatory arrangements, customs clearing operations (both in the country of origin and county 
of destination) etc. FDIs based firms have relevant knowledge about all these things as they 
are experienced in foreign trade and have well developed distributions networks and strategies. 
They use that experience and network to export for the new recipient country. Local firms can 
collaborate in these business ventures and acquire knowledge and experience that can after 
use for they own independent operations. This is a combination of collaboration and imitation. 
Collaboration is typical vertical spillover effect in the case of export. As already discussed in 
previous paragraphs, increased standards of demand for the inputs provides incentives for the 
local producers to adjust their operations to these standards and enables them to be competitive 
by these standards. These standards are basically international standards. If you supply and 
FDI based company in your country, than it is not a problem for your local company to supply 
company in the country of origin of that or any other FDI. That is the way how collaboration 
with the FDI based companies enables local firms to become exporters.
Imitation of the operations of FDI based companies is more likely to be the method of enabling 
local companies from the same industry to become exporters. Competition with the FDI based 
company will provide incentives to improve the quality of the products and to go through all the 
barriers for foreign trade (export) and some of the information about export channels of the 
FDI based companies will inevitably be disclosed. Nonetheless, it is much more probable that 
collaboration, i.e. vertical spillovers will be the mechanism which will enable local companies to 
become exporters. 
The other important channel of intra-industry spillover effects are investment in human 
capital. New technology, new products and processes, as well as superior know-how and 
managerial/organizational innovations brought by Greenfield FDIs can be effective and can 
results in high rate of returns only if there are substantial investments in human capital, i.e. 
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training of local labor force. Crucial decision whether to invest in one country or not depends on 
the local labor force and local labor market – whether labor force can be obtained at competitive, 
reasonable price (wages). Nonetheless, hiring local labor force is just a first step for getting all 
the things right. That labor force should be trained according to the requimen4ts of the FDI, i.e. 
international operator that invested in a country. That means training in all contemporary state-
of-art know-how, managerial/organizational innovations and modern standard, specific proce-
dures division of labor within the firm, and discipline and working habits that are usually stricter 
that in local firms. Seminars and training courses are arranged in the local/recipient country, but 
also in the country of the FDI origin and/or some of its international training centers. All these 
procedures increases human capital of the employees of the Greenfield FDIs – they are inevitable 
from the point of view of the investors, because only in that way the investor can use superior 
technology/know-how to get high rates of returns and pay back the investment sooner.    
  
Box 4 
Investments in human capital
Continuous training of the employees is one of the most distinguished activities of the Greenfield 
FDIs in Serbia. Raiffeisen bank provides day-by-day training and training for managers on manage-
ment seminars that are hold on the regional level (SEE). These seminars are also opportunity for 
exchange experience and regional best practices. Ball Packaging provides extensive training accord-
ing to the standards of the company that are applied on all countries of their operations. This train-
ing encompasses such advance procedures like paperless administration, including paperless audit, 
a procedure that is great innovation by any standard. Ball Packaging training includes dissemina-
tion of the specific corporate ethics, and corporate culture and discipline. For example, there is 
an emphasis on the personal safety issues. Vip mobile provides three general category of training: 
expert knowledge, soft skills and exchange of best practice and know-how within mobilkom austria 
group. In the early stage mobilkom austria group provided the Greenfield with the group of over 40 
experts who developed all company functions with local teams. That was the first stage of training, 
a specific learning-by-doing operation. Again, training includes development of specific corporate 
culture and training events are organized in various locations in Serbia for disseminating and shar-
ing these basic corporate values.
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Nonetheless, the fluctuation of labor is something that is normal to all modern societies. The 
fact that one firm invested in human capital does not preclude the employees to leave that firm. 
For Greenfield FDI’s firm it is impossible to lock-in its human resources completely. It can be 
done temporarily, by provision of minimal stay within the firms, but even that is more difficult 
with modern labor legislation, more in line with human rights approach. Accordingly, well trained 
employee can leave the FDI’s firm and reallocate his labor resources to the other firms. Who are 
the mostly likely candidates, in terms of the firms these employees can move to? Naturally, 
the mostly likely candidates are the other, mainly local companies from the same industry, i.e. 
competitors that are obtaining fully trained personal with the level of training above the one 
they have provided to their employees. That is perhaps the most important spillover effect – the 
returns to the human capital are disproportional to the investments in that very human capital. 
Spillover effects due to described investments in human capital need not to be horizontal, i.e. 
they are not only intra-industry. Many of these investments are more or less general, and are not 
specific to some industry, but to general business operations. For example, training of accoun-
tants in modern accounting standards by the Greenfield FDI’s firm produces human capital that 
can be used in almost all other industries. This is particularly case in some specific types of these 
investments like financial services in which it is easy to switch from one financial industry like 
banking to the other financial industry like insurance. There is no need for any business link 
between the FDI firm and the firms that are enjoying spillover effects due to training of the labor 
force – the link is established via labor market.       
All of the mentioned spillovers that are spillovers to the local firms are, at the end of the day, 
spillovers to the local consumers, i.e. consumers of the recipient country. Due to the mentioned 
mechanism/channels of the spillovers to the firms, consumers are facing new products, more 
option to choose among, new and better ways to service them and their needs. Their needs are 
better services, among other things, throughout better marketing, better pricing policy and 
innovation in customers’ relations. As already described, new standards of serving the customers 
are introduced and it is followed by the local firms. Important segment of these standards can be 
completely new and much more affordable pricing policies and tariff rates that are enforced. 
Furthermore, innovative ways to serve customers that are brought by Greenfield FDI makes 
the consumers in better position to articulate their needs and preferences. Accordingly, 
consumers’ welfare can be improved also in this way, as their communication with the supply 
side firms, i.e. producers and vendors is improved. Customers in the business sector can also 
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gain from the business interactions with FDIs as these relations are channeled through new, 
state-of-art business procedures. 
There are informational spillovers of the FDIs and they are specific to the Greenfield and 
other FDIs. The very fact that one investor decides to invest in some country, at some location 
and in some specific industry provides information to all other that such investment is not 
only feasible, but also profitable. The bigger investment, and the more prominent investor, 
the stronger is the signal, i.e. the bigger is probability that additional foreign direct investor 
will decide to invest in that very country, region and industry. That will affect not only foreign 
investors, but also domestic investors. The point is that the when reluctant domestic investors 
realize that foreigners are investing in his/her country, that will increase probability for domestic 
investor to invest locally, instead of alternatives like long term-savings (generating fixed rate 
earnings) or investing abroad. Empirical research based on the data for 60 developing countries 
(Mody and Murshid, 2005) provided evidence on string “crowding-in” effect, i.e. evidence that 
increased FDIs produced increased domestic investments. Informational spillovers, though not 
only them, produce clusters, i.e. groups of the firms from the same industry involved in the 
similar products.          
Box 5 
Financial reporting
New products developed by Raiffeisen bank, a Greenfield FDI, provided not only new opportunities 
to the local business community, but also new challenges to them. As the probability for approv-
ing and extending new loans to the local firms depends on the quality of their financial reporting 
and the track record of its financial discipline, they have all the incentives to improve both. As to 
the first one, local firms started to voluntary submit their financial report to external audit, and to 
make financial reports more reliable. As to the second one, local firms are now aware that breach-
ing financial discipline will have negative effects on the long run, so they have incentives not to 
breach it. In short, both financial reporting format and substance have improved. And it is not only 
a Greenfield FDI in banking that benefits from such an improvement. There are free riders like the 
Tax administration, other banks, business partners of the local firms, etc.
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Finally, there is no doubts that public policies, particularly economic policies, and reform 
of these policies influences the level of FDI (more detailed analysis of specific policy reforms 
that attracts FDIs follows in the next chapter). Furthermore, institutional reform and insti-
tution building is also very important for attracting FDIs. It was demonstrated in a number 
of recent contributions, both theoretical and empirical (for example, Campos and Kinoshita, 
2008) that liberalization of foreign trade, financial liberalization and privatization increases the 
relative level (relative to the GDP) of the FDIs. Furthermore, institutional reform and institu-
tional development that increases, for example, the quality of bureaucracy and constrains to the 
executive branch and rule of law indicators and decreases, for example, corruption and political 
risk, increases the relative level of FDIs. These findings became a kind of common place and 
conventional wisdom. They are not only restricted to the academic circles and very technical 
papers published in academic journals. Policy makers in many, almost all countries are aware of 
these regularities and, because attracting FDIs for many countries is the only way to establish 
sustainable economic growth, they pursue or at least under a political pressure to pursue these 
public policies and specific institutional reform. Accordingly, there are spillover effects to the 
local firms, because the mentioned public policies and institutional developments have beneficial 
effects to local firms as well as to the FDIs.        
Increased level of FDIs proved to have substantial beneficial effects not only on economic, 
but also to some other public policies. They provide impetus for more benevolent foreign policy 
of both recipient country and country of origin. Both governments have very good reasons to 
maintain good diplomatic relations and even to improve them, because they are somewhat 
“hostages” of the FDIs that already materialized and that are expected by business community 
and consumers of both countries. Accordingly, FDIs have beneficial spillover effects to political 
integration of the countries. Most of the FDIs today materialize among the countries that are 
politically integrated like countries of the Euro-Atlantic political integration.   
4. Magnitude and measurement of spillover effects
If spillover effects are too small, FDIs are not beneficial after all apart from the direct effects. 
Nonetheless, the crucial problem is that spillover effects should not be too small, but also not 
too big. If the spillover effects are too big, that means that the investors are not able to capture 
the majority of the benefits they are creating, which means that their returns are modest. In 
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very competitive world of the FDIs, investors compare rates of returns in different countries 
and make their investment decisions on the base of that rate. Huge spillovers make rates lower, 
hence the probability for investments to materialize in such conditions is decreasing. If the spill-
overs are too small, its is only the FDIs sector of the economy that is generating growth and a 
substantial division exists between two sectors in the economy: one of the FDIs, modern sector 
well integrated in the international economy and the other is the sector of local firms, sluggish 
and not integrated to the international economy. Not too small and not to big: the best balance 
of the spillover effects.   
Furthermore, there is another important question regarding the magnitude of these effects. 
The rationale for providing government intervention incentives for FDIs is spillovers. One should 
recollect that the very ground of spillover effects is that there are external economies, i.e. that 
investors are not able to capture them in their returns. Exactly because of that, some people 
and decision-makers think that FDIs should be effectively subsidized through, for example, tax 
holidays, or even explicit subsidized, measured as government grants to the investors, based 
on for example number of jobs that are created. Prima facie it could seem reasonable to some 
people. But the crucial precondition for that operation to be reasonable is that the amount of 
the subsidies is not bigger than the amount of created spillover effects. That creates enormous 
methodological problem of measuring spillover effects, like measuring any kind of external 
economies.  
There have been a few efforts to econometrically measure spillover effects for different 
countries, regions and time periods. All of them have faced insurmountable methodological 
problem of measurement and other econometric problems. Testing to what extend FDIs influence 
economic growth in the countries of Central Europe Mencinger (2003) found evidence that there 
are no spillover effects, but that finding is based on numerous rather crude methodological 
errors. The similar finding for the same groups of countries has been reinforced (Damijan et 
al., 2003), but with similar methodological problems. Two most important contributions in the 
area (Schoors and Van der Tol, 2005 and Castellani and Zanfei, 2006) demonstrated that specific 
methodological error created bias downwards in the estimated of the spillover effects. Both 
contributions found empirical evidence that spillover effects are significant. Nonetheless, it is 
impossible to measure precisely spillover effects and to disclose them in monetary terms. 
That is one of the crucial reasons why FDIs should not be subsidized. If the government does 
not know what is the amount of the benefit, than the government can not specify the amount 
of the subsidy. Another reason why active measures for attracting FDIs like subsidies are not 
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recommendable would be due to the special interest politics and public choice procedures that 
can lead towards that private interest capture the state. It is always much better to improve the 
public policy and institutional framework that equally affect all the players (investors) and to 
have leveled playing filed that to have highly focused support, as it will have winners and losers. 
Winner have incentive to influence the process and transparency is then lost.   
5. Preconditions of the spillover effects
Much more important issue is the one about the absorptive capacity of the recipient country, i.e. 
absorptive capacity of the local firms. The point whether local firms will benefit from the FDIs 
depends on their relative backwardness and their absorptive capacity for assimilating knowledge 
and innovations. That capacity depends on the complexity of the technology and know-how 
that is transferred trough FDIs and the technology/know-how gap between local firms and the 
Greenfield FDIs’ based firms. There was enough evidence in empirical research to support this 
main finding. The bottom line is that local firms can benefit only if the technological/know-how 
is not too wide, so local/domestic firms can absorb the knowledge available from the Greenfield 
FDIs. The problem is, however, the measuring the size of the technology gap. What is the 
threshold, i.e. a technological gap that provides to be a barrier for the spillover effects? It is 
not disputable that on the recipient side, local firms must have some absorption capacity, but it 
is still very difficult to say what is the exact necessary level for spillovers to be accepted, i.e. to 
materialize. Furthermore, for the time being, dynamic factor is not taken into account. 
It is evident that different absorption capacity means different levels of spillover effects. If the 
local firms are divided to exporters and non-exporters, that could be a proxy for their absorptive 
capacity. Empirical research done in Spain (Barrios and Strobel, 2002) demonstrated that spillover 
effects in the case of exporters and much more intensive than in the case of non-exporters as 
their absorptive capacity is lower. Furthermore, local firms can be distinguished whether they 
are R&D intensive, and that can be a proxy for their absorptive capacity. Empirical research done 
on Czech Republic (Kinoshita, 2001) provided evidence that there were positive spillover effects 
in the case of the firms that are R&D intensive. In other words, absorption capacity matters. 
As to the absorption capacity, it is now evident the attention should not be focused only to 
local firms and their capabilities as such. A part of overall absorption capacity of the recipient 
country is based on the features of the local labor force, predominantly its capacity to learn and 
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to learn fast local labor and the flexibility of the local labor market, for example, how frequent 
is turnover in terms of employed labor. That will trigger perhaps the most important channel of 
spillover effects: the one based in the investment in human capital. 
Empirical research (Mody, 2004) demonstrated that the education of the local labor force, 
measures by the years of schooling, significantly contributes to the absorption capacity of the 
country and the magnitude of spillover effects. Apart from the local labor force, empirical evidence 
was found that local infrastructure and financial market development are crucial factors of the 
absorption capacity of the country (Kinoshita and Liu, 2007).
6. Conclusion
The is no doubt that spillover effects of the FDIs, particularly of the Greenfield FDIs are 
substantial and important for economic growth and welfare of recipient’s country society. It was 
demonstrated that these effects are versatile and that they have impact on both producers (in 
the some and in the other industries) and consumers. At the end of the day there is a beneficial 
impact to consumers. Spillover effects are particularly important in the case of some industries, 
Box 6  
Myths and realities about Serbian labor force
Labor in Serbian is not a cheap resource. Labor costs of firms that operate in Serbia are not low. 
Hence this is not something that attracts FDI to Serbia. It is the flexibility of the labor force and its 
ability to learn fast. Some background education helps. What is important is that labor force in Ser-
bia has it own quality, dynamism and it is highly motivated and very adaptable – it can adapt to new 
business principles and culture. Locally trained engineers are considered as the best offspring of 
Serbian education system. Furthermore, Serbian labor force is rather loyal to the employer and the 
turnout of the labor is much smaller than in some EE countries. Absenteeism is not big. In the case 
of Ball Packaging FDI the absenteeism in Serbia is lower compared with their facility in the UK. 
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like modern telecommunications and banking industry, as they have become a kind of a prereq-
uisite for modern economic growth, a growth of the new economy.
There are two very important finding regarding the recipient country. The first one is that it 
proved impossible to measure precisely spillover effects and to disclose then in monetary terms. 
Methodological obstacles to that proved to be too high. Taking that into account it should be 
recommended that a country should not subsidize the FDIs. Some people find rationale for such 
subsidies in the very fact that investors are not capturing spillover effects they are producing, so 
they should be compensated for that. Without precise measurement such compensation is not 
feasible. Let alone the damage that it can make as the private interest capture the state. 
The second finding is that the scale and scope of spillover effects heavily depends on the 
recipient country, predominantly local firms and their absorptive capacity. It is of the crucial 
importance that the gap between foreign direct investors and local firms in not too big, otherwise, 
the spillover effects will be negligible. It is the labor force of the country which is crucial for the 
absorptive capacity. The more flexible labor market and better education, the better labor force 
propensity toward greater absorptive capacity.     
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1. FDI Determinants
The decisions on locations of investments are usually based on thorough detailed calculations. 
The nature of this decision-making process has not been thoroughly analyzed, but there were 
some surveys of multinational companies that shed some light on this issue (Delloite and 
Touche 2001).
One thing which is clear is that FDIs are in principle a very heterogeneous group. Various 
investment motives determine the importance of different investment factors. For example, 
resource-seeking investments have relatively short list of demands – easy access to the resource, 
infrastructure of adequate quality and tolerable levels of corruption and environmental 
regulation. On the other side, market-seeking investors look for large economies with strong 
consumer purchasing power, countries with expected growth in living standards and countries 
which are members of regional free trading areas. Efficiency-seeking investors look for countries 
in which low wages will not be swamped by unproductive workers, inadequate infrastructure, 
intrusive and inconsistent regulation and pervasive corruption.
It is clear that different objectives, needs and strategies have caused companies to design 
different mechanisms for evaluating investment location. However, there are certain criteria 
which consistently show up in the research: access to consumers, stable social and political 
environment, ease of doing business, reliability and quality of physical infrastructure, ability to 
hire technical professionals, ability to hire management staff, level of corruption, cost of labor, 
crime and safety, corporate tax rates, cost of utilities, etc.
UNCTAD’s 1998 Report classifies determinants of the FDIs in three distinct groups: policy 
framework, economic determinants and business facilitation.
According to UNCTAD, policy framework consists of all the business regulations that the 
government introduces in order to regulate business activities, such as tax policy, privati-
zation policy, regulations regarding business entry, construction, labor relations etc. Economic 
determinants are usually exogenous factors (at least in the short run), such as market share, 
consumer preferences, geographical position of the market, natural resources etc. UNCTAD also 
identifies a group of factors, called “business facilitation”, which include some public policies, 
such as financial incentives for investments, but also a host of other factors, such as existence of 
bilingual schools, corruption and such.
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Our focus in this chapter shall primarily to the first group of determinants (policy 
framework, business climate, business environment) with a limited insight into two other 
groups of determinants. 
The key determinant of the FDI inflows to a certain country, which is under the direct 
government influence, is the business climate (business environment). Business climate consists 
of all public policies that affect the business operations, such as tax policy, trade policy, labor 
policy, zoning and construction policy etc.
Taking into account the increased international mobility of capital in the previous years and 
the expectation that these trends will continue, the governments have realized that in order 
to attract foreign investments (especially export-oriented ones), thorough reforms in the area 
of business environment are needed. Some critics see this deregulation movement as “race to 
the bottom”, but in reality most of the regulations are serving some special interest and their 
removal usually does not have a large negative impact on general public.
The following graph demonstrates the trend of reduction in effective marginal corporate tax 
rates in OECD countries (Hajkova et al.), which is an indicator of improved business climate.
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Figure 1   Reduction in Marginal Corporate Tax Rates
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The same paper concludes that FDI’s are very sensitive to corporate taxes and that one percent 
increase in marginal corporate tax rate leads to a 2% to 4.5% reduction in the FDI stock in the 
country. 
Besides taxation, other government policies also have a direct effect on the FDI inflow. For 
example, Yavorcik and Sparteanu (2005) demonstrate that “the FDI location choice as well as 
the volume of FDI is positively related to labor market flexibility in the host country and to the 
difference between labor market regulations in the host and the source country. That is, a more 
flexible labor market in the host economy (relative to the investor’s home country) is associated 
with a higher likelihood of investment. As expected, this effect matters more for firms operating 
in services sectors than for manufacturing companies.”
These and other academic papers stress the importance of reasonable business regulations 
and demonstrate their impact on FDI inflows.
But, besides direct business regulations, other government policies also influence investor 
decision. One of the key government activities, of importance for FDI, is protection of private 
property and proper administration of justice.
Namely, investors always take into account the probability that their property and revenue 
might be stolen by predators or expropriated by the government. The lower this probability 
is, the higher the estimated rate of return is and the higher the probability that investment 
shall occur.
2. Components of the Business Environment
The concept of business environment is very fluid. The components of the business environment 
are many, but one of the best international comparisons regarding the business environment is 
the “Doing Business” report series prepared by the World Bank.
Namely, this report provides measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 
178 countries in the world. The report covers ten main areas: Starting a business; Dealing with 
licenses; Employing workers; Registering property; Getting credit; Protecting investors; Paying 
taxes; Trading across borders; Enforcing contracts; Closing a business.
All of these factors (excluding perhaps “Getting Credit” to a certain extend) are very relevant 
for foreign investors making decision on where to invest.
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Starting a business is related to the ease of opening a new company and registering it with the 
government. The data on starting a business are based on a survey and research investigating the 
procedures that a standard small to medium-size company needs to complete to start operations 
legally. These include obtaining all necessary permits and licenses and completing all required 
inscriptions, verifications and notifications with authorities to enable the company to formally 
operate.
Dealing with licenses is probably the most relevant factor for Greenfield investments as it is 
primarily related to the land development, i.e. building licenses and permissions – it deals with 
non-specific licenses needed for developing a plot of land a constructing a typological business 
outlet, a rather small warehouse. This includes all town-planning licences, development permits, 
infrastructures/utilities compliance licenses, public health, fire protection and that kind of 
permits. Specific licenses, i.e. for operations in specific industries, like mobile telecommuni-
cations, banking, finance etc. are not taken into accent in the case of “dealing with licenses”. 
In many countries, especially poor ones, complying with building codes and regulations is so 
costly in time and money that many developers/investors opt out. Investors may pay bribes to 
pass inspections or simply build illegally—leading to hazardous construction. In other countries 
compliance is simple, straightforward and inexpensive—yielding better results.
As already mentioned, investors usually prefer a more flexible labor market. Almost every 
economy has established a complex system of laws and institutions intended to protect workers 
and guarantee a minimum standard of living for its population. This system encompasses four 
bodies of law: employment, industrial relations, social security and occupational health and 
safety laws. Doing Business Report examines government regulation in the area of employment 
and social security laws.
Registering property is also very important for any investor, since unregistered property faces 
higher risk of being stolen and/or expropriated. Simply, investors want to have an easy way 
of registering the property and of having a way to prove the legitimacy of their ownership. In 
addition, clear property ownership allows leveraging the property and securing financing.
Protecting investors is another measure developed in the Doing Business Report of importance 
for deciding on FDI location. The idea behind this indicator is to assess the protection that (usually) 
minority shareholders have against company managers. If the property rights of investors are 
not protected, majority ownership in a business is the only way to eliminate chances of expro-
priation by managers. But then investors must devote more oversight attention to fewer invest-
ments. The result: entrepreneurship is suppressed, and fewer profitable investment projects are 
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undertaken. However, this specific case is not very important for the type of FDI’s that we are 
looking at, since most of FDI and Greenfield investment cases involve having a majority stake at 
the company.
Paying taxes is another indicator. This indicator does not just include the tax rates and levels, 
but also the complexness and amount of red tape related to the tax collection. Poor countries 
tend to use businesses as a main collection point for taxes. Rich countries tend to have lower 
tax rates and less complex tax systems. And rich countries get more from their taxes. Simple, 
moderate taxes and fast, cheap administration mean less hassle for businesses—and also more 
revenue collected and better public services. More burdensome tax regimes create a strong 
incentive to evade taxes.
Trading across borders is one of the key activities in the daily operations of basically any foreign 
investor. Most foreign-owned companies import a lot and export a lot. Countries that have efficient 
customs, good transport networks and fewer document requirements – making compliance with 
export and import procedures faster and cheaper – are more competitive. That leads to more 
exports - and exports are associated with faster growth and more jobs. Additionally, a need to file 
many documents is associated with more corruption in the customs and state administration.
As already mentioned, protection of private property and enforcement of contracts is usually 
very high on the investors check list. Businesses that have little or no access to efficient courts 
must rely on other mechanisms, both formal and informal – such as trade associations, social 
networks, credit bureaus or private information channels – to decide whom to do business with 
and under what conditions. Across countries, the more procedures it takes to enforce a contract, 
the longer the delays and the higher the cost.
Closing business procedures also tend to be very cumbersome. Bottlenecks in bankruptcy cut 
into the amount claimants can recover. In countries where bankruptcy is used, this is a strong 
deterrent to investment. Access to credit shrinks, and nonperforming loans and financial risk 
grow because creditors cannot recover overdue loans. Conversely, efficient bankruptcy laws can 
encourage entrepreneurs. The freedom to fail, and to do so through an efficient process, puts 
people and capital to their most effective use. The result is more productive businesses and more 
jobs.
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3. Serbia
Serbia has seen a big progress in the past several years on the business climate front. However, 
many obstacles remain. 
The Strategy for Foreign Direct Investments, adopted by the Serbian Government, stresses 
that there are four main groups of obstacles for FDI’s in Serbia:
1. Legislative problems
a) Urban land ownership and other land-related problems
b) Need for substantial improvement and modernization of court system
c) The need for a more comprehensive legislative changes
d) Reform of the construction-related (land development) legislation
e) The system of land use fees and charges undermines Serbian competitiveness and 
creates insecure environment
2. Limited institutional capacities for the implementation of reforms and for strategic 
planning and marketing 
a) The need to make all investment-related issues a priority for all state institutions
b) The need to give a priority ranking to the capacity building for investment promotion, 
strategic planning and policy development
c) Improve the administration of construction/development permits by developing 
One -Stop-Shop principle 
d) The need to support private sector and educational system in overall reform 
process
3. Late start of reforms, inadequate infrastructure and limited access to measures to 
improve competitiveness
a) The need to accelerate economic reforms process, introduction of modern regulatory 
framework and privatization of large state owned companies
b) The need to develop industrial and technology parks
c) The need to improve access and reduce administration costs of accreditation, quality 
control, certification and access to other international standards.
4. The need for a better understanding of the importance of FDI’s and development of 
programs sensitive to the investor needs and a well-targeted national investment 
promotion program.
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Basically, one can conclude that the government is fully aware of the importance of the business 
environment for the inflow of FDI’s. The strategy does stress almost all of the key issues faced 
by Serbia and identified by the investors as important – land ownership, costs of administration, 
privatization of state-owned companies. Also, the strategy is followed by a rather well-developed 
Action plan.
Doing Business Report provides a similar assessment. As can be seen from the following table, 
the main problems in Serbia are linked to dealing with non-specific land-development licenses,1 
paying taxes, court related issues (registering property, enforcing contracts) and employing 
workers (labor market flexibility).
Table 1   Doing Business 2008: Ranking of Serbia
Category Doing Business 
2008
ease of doing business 86
starting a business 90
dealing with licenses 149
employing Workers 110
registering Property 115
Getting credit 13
Protecting Workers 64
Paying taxes 121
trading across borders 58
enforcing contracts 101
closing a business 103
1 as it has already been emphasized, dealing with licenses does not include specific licenses needed for operations 
in specific industries like telecommunications, banking, finances etc.  
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Starting a Business
Starting a business in Serbia is still relatively difficult and costly. Although significant reforms 
in this area have been implemented with the creation of the new Business Registration Agency, 
Serbia is still ranked as 90th in the world.
Doing Business report documents that starting a business includes 11 different steps, which 
take 23 days and cost 12% of GDP per capita. Detailed analysis shows that Business Registration 
Agency is relatively efficient, but that other actors in this process (notably Tax Administration) 
are relatively inefficient. For example, it takes 11 days to obtain Tax Identification Number 
(PIB) and to register with the Tax Administration. 
Table 2   Starting a Business: a Regional View
Country Procedures (number) Duration(days) Cost 
(% of GNI per capita)
bosnia and Herzegovina 12 54 30.1
bulgaria 9 32 8.4
croatia 8 40 11.7
Hungary 6 16 17.7
macedonia, fYr 9 15 6.6
montenegro 15 24 6.2
Serbia 11 23 11.9
As can be seen from the table, Serbia has more required procedures, but the duration is below 
regional average.
Land Issues
The most important obstacle in Serbia for FDI’s in general and Greenfield investments in 
particular is acquiring the land and starting construction/development.
First of all, urban land in Serbia is still exclusively state-owned and therefore, the existing 
system of use of urban land does not allow the land market and the transfer of the ownership in 
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land. On the other hand, the economic theory, and the business practice of developed countries 
both indicate that without true market allocation for a particular resource, there are no possi-
bilities for its economically efficient use. 
The existing model of urban land does not represent a good base for persuading investors to 
invest in Serbia. It is natural that the investment decision does not depend only on the commercial 
aspect of the activity in question, but also on the possibilities for stable and predictable use of 
land on which the intended structure is to be built. If the use of land is uncertain or unpre-
dictable, then surely the interest of potential investors grows dimmer.  
There are several sources of uncertainty in the existing model of using urban land. First of all, there 
is the uncertainty about the duration of use of land. Namely, even when the land is leased out for an 
indefinite period of time or when it is leased for a definite time, there is no strong guarantee that this 
will be respected by the authorities and that the user will be able to exploit the land in a manner that 
he initially planned. This is because the state can, and has done before, change the conditions of use 
of land through changes in the laws and local ordinances, and significantly influence the elements of 
agreements concerning land. It is possible that regulation plans and with them the intended type of 
uses of individual plots change, which would then be grounds for the termination of the right to use 
for an indefinite period of time, or even that for a definite period of time. Simply put, the state as the 
lessor just cannot offer the same amount of certainty as a private lessor because the state can change 
the conditions of use by unilateral actions, the way she sees fit. 
Another point is that there is uncertainty in the possible privatisation of urban land, and especially 
in the method of privatisation of the parcel of urban land that an investor is using or wants to use. 
Of course, privatisation of urban land is possible, even probable in all transition or post-transition 
countries, therefore making the potential investors wonder about the probability and the possible 
direction of such privatisation. It is clear why the possibility of privatisation bothers investors: it is 
easily conceivable that their status might deteriorate or that they might be burdened by increased 
costs in such an event. This is because the following facts: 1) considering that until the parliament 
has reached the corresponding legislation the method of privatisation remains unknown, the 
existing lessee or user of state-owned land cannot know what specific measures will be adopted 
and whether or not he will remain the user after the privatisation had taken effect; 2) even if he 
was to remain the user, it is possible that he might be forced to pay a large sum for the purchase of 
land, which, together with the previously paid charges (such as the urban land development fee) 
might be a princely sum, even more than the piece of land in question is worth and more than the 
investor was prepared to pay initially. 
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Thirdly, there is uncertainty regarding the amount of the land use fee. Again, this is not a 
private legal matter, a contractual document entered into by a private owner and a lessee, where 
the method of indexation or change of lease amount would be known and agreed upon up front; 
this is a contract with the state which she can change, even through amendments in the legis-
lation, in such a way as to replace the correction mechanism whenever she feels like it. It is clear 
then that long-term effects of the change of the mechanism for the correction of lease may be 
quite extensive. 
Fourth, related to the previous issues, it is very hard, almost impossible, for the investor to 
appraise the value of any given parcel of land. The main reason for that is, apart from the afore-
mentioned uncertainties, the non-existence of the legal market of urban land and the non-exis-
tence of full ownership over urban land. The legal market of urban land does not exist because it 
is owned by the state and is only given to users to be used, i.e. the users may not sell it without 
the structures that lie on it. Transfer of land is possible only together with the structure upon it, 
but then it is not possible to separate the price paid for the structure from the price paid for the 
land. State ownership of urban land makes the user of urban land possess only a portion of overall 
property rights, i.e. the user is entitled to use the land in accordance with the law. Even aside from 
the fact that a certain piece of urban land is in state ownership, it still has, or may have a certain 
economic value for the user, because it enables, or may enable, an economic activity in accor-
dance with the prescribed land use. The uncertainty relating to the value of land definitely deters 
potential investors from investing, because it is difficult to opt for an investment when the investor 
himself is unable to comprehend what the gained property is actually worth in the market. 
All these uncertainties surely decrease the readiness of potential investors to invest in Serbia. 
This applies to both real property investors, i.e. those who practice construction/development 
and sale of commercial and residential space, and to the investors who would like to invest into 
economic companies. That this is not only theoretical reasoning is confirmed by information on 
how foreign investors view the land regime in Serbia and its consequences: dissatisfaction with 
the fact the land is in state ownership and with the method of its use is widespread and especially 
aggravated with uncertainty regarding future events. 
However, even if we assume that land privatisation program shall be implemented in the 
near future, there are many other land-related obstacles faced by the potential investor. Doing 
Business reports that, in order to construct a standardized warehouse, there are 20 separate 
procedures, which take 204 days and cost more than 33 GDPs per capita.
Serbia is ranked 149th out of 178 countries assessed in this report.
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The following table shows the comparison between Serbia and neighbouring countries in three 
subcomponents – number of procedures, time and cost for dealing with the licenses relevant for 
the development of the plot of urban land.
Table 3   Dealing with Licences: a  Regional View
Country Number of Procedures Time (days) Cost 
(% of GDP per capita)
bosnia and Herzegovina 16 467 790
bulgaria 22 131 500
croatia 22 255 722
Hungary 31 211 10
macedonia, frY 19 192 110
montenegro 19 185 600
Serbia 20 204 2713
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Figure 2   Dealing with Licences: Global Ranking
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It can be seen that in terms of number of procedures and time needed to obtain all the licenses 
and permissions, Serbia does not lag significantly behind the neighbouring countries. However, 
in terms of cost, Serbia is more than three times more expensive than the next most expensive 
neighbouring country.
The following graph shows the time and financial cost distribution:
Figure 3   Building a Warehouse in Serbia
The procedure 11, which is by far the most costly is “Paying Land Development Fee”. It is 
clear that time that some procedures require is very long, such as 60 days to obtain a main 
construction project clearance from the traffic authority (procedure 8 in the Chart).
Foreign Investors Council also stresses the importance of land issues for FDI growth. Namely, 
in their most recent White Book (2007), this association of foreign investors recommends the 
following activities:
Restitution of urban land - develop process to ensure transparency;•	
Privatization of urban land not subject to restitution;•	
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Creating industrial/technology parks (National Investment Plan);•	
Increased application of Article 86 of LOUPC (Law on Urban Planning and construction) •	
in terminating rights of use for state-owned urban lands;
Adoption of the Law on Property of Local Self-Governments;•	
Improve links between public offices, availability of data and training.•	
These shortcomings are also recognized in the government FDI Strategy. The Strategy recom-
mends that the Parliament should adopt a new Law on Planning and Construction, which should 
simplify and accelerate the whole construction/development process, especially related to leasing 
the land and granting construction permits. The new Law shall have to be more precise and clear 
and to prevent municipal officials from arbitrary decision-making. Also, the regulations should 
be clear regarding criteria for determining the level of the lease fee and land development fee. 
Further, the goal of the legislation should be that the procedure for granting construction permit 
upon the receipt of all the relevant document should take no longer than 15 days.
The Government Strategy also recognizes the need to privatize urban land. The Strategy 
proposes that both physical and legal entities should be allowed to buy the land from the state, 
which would use the funds to compensate former owners. 
Judiciary and property issues
Serbia ranks poorly with regards to contract enforcement and other, more or less court-related 
procedures (closing a business, registering property). On all these issues Serbia is ranked below 
100th place in the world. 
Important and positive steps have been taken in these areas, primarily by taking the juris-
diction for bankruptcy process and for property registration out of the courts. However, contract 
enforcement is, and has to be, done in courts.
Compared to the regional economies, contract enforcement in Serbia lasts the longest and 
takes twice the time of that in Hungary.
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Table 4   Contract Enforcement: a Regional View
Country Number of Procedures Duration (days) Cost (% of claim)
bosnia and Herzegovina 38 595 38.4
bulgaria 40 564 22.2
croatia 38 561 13.8
Hungary 33 335 13
macedonia, frY 39 385 33.1
montenegro 49 545 25.7
Serbia 36 635 28.4
There was no progress on this issue in the past three years.
Table 5   Progress in Contract Enforcement
Enforcing Contracts Doing Business 2006 Doing Business 2007 Doing Business 2008
rank  99 101
Procedures (number) 36 36 36
duration (days) 635 635 635
cost (% of claim) 28.4 28.4 28.4
Serbian FDI Strategy recognizes the importance of court efficiency for the inflow of 
FDI’s. The separate Annex of the Strategy deals only with the Court efficiency issues. The 
goal that the Strategy sets it to create a judiciary system which could, with its expertise 
and efficiency, respond to the needs of modern business, with speed and accuracy as the 
most important goals.
Paying Taxes and Trading Across Border
Paying taxes and trading across border are probably activities where the company gets into 
the most frequent contacts with the state administration. Although both of these activities are 
recurring and not specifically linked to either Greenfield or even foreign investment in general, 
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companies value efficient and not too cumbersome administration of imports, exports and paying 
taxes. Needless to mention, they also prefer lower taxes and customs duties.
Serbia is ranked relatively highly (58th position) on the Trading Across Border indicator. This 
is also the area where paperwork and time to import and export has been significantly reduced 
in the past three years.
On the other side, Paying Taxes indicator is much more problematic, since Serbia is ranked 
121st in the world. Additionally, there was no progress in the past three years. In a specific case, 
documented by the Doing Business Report, there are 66 tax payments per year (compared with 
the world leader Sweden, where only two payments per year are made), it takes 279 days to pay 
those taxes and the average business tax rate is 35.8%.
Compared to other countries in the region, the number of payments is very high, but the 
overall tax rate is relatively low, while time needed to pay the taxes is in the middle.
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Figure 4   Trading Across Borders
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Table 6   Paying Taxes: a Regional View
Country Payment (number) Time (hours) Total tax rate (% of profits)
bosnia and Herzegovina 51 368 44.1
bulgaria 17 616 36.7
croatia 28 196 32.5
Hungary 24 340 55.1
macedonia, fYr 52 96 49.8
montenegro 88 372 31.6
Serbia 66 279 35.8
Labor Market Regulations
Doing Business Report also ranks countries according to the labor market regulations (employing 
workers indicator). Serbia ranks 110th, which is very low and also, there was some deterioration 
in 2006, after the adoption of the new Labor Law.
Figure 5   Labor Market Regulation: Change in Time
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Compared to its neighbors, Serbia is ranked in the middle in terms of the rigidity of employment, 
but is better in terms of the non wage labor costs and firing costs than most of its neighbors. 
Table 7   Flexibility of the Labor Market: a Regional View
country rigidity of 
employment index
non wage labor cost 
(% of salaries)
firing costs 
(weeks of wages)
bosnia and Herzegovina 46 15 31
bulgaria 29 23 9
croatia 50 17 39
Hungary 30 34 35
macedonia, fYr 50 33 26
montenegro 38 18 39
Serbia 46 18 25
4. Conclusion
There is no doubt that business environment is decisive for investors to make their decisions 
about FDIs in general and Greenfield investments in particular. Many components of that 
environment are endogenous, i.e. recipient’s county government can do something about it. 
Although Serbia substantially improved its business environment in the recent years, there 
is a huge room for improvement. A single area that needs to be substantially improved is 
the one related to “dealing with licenses”, i.e. the costs of developing a plot of land. Since 
this specific cost/obstacle is relevant for Greenfield investments only, this is perhaps a part 
of the answer to the question why other forms of FDIs have been more intensive. As it was 
demonstrated this particular obstacle proved to be a combination of poor legislation and 
its unproductive enforcement by local authorities who are in charge of its implementation. 
Obviously there is a room for improvements on both levels, particularly as a competition 
for attracting FDIs can be developed among the local authorities in Serbia in, for example, 
creating industrial parks. 
Improvement regarding paying taxes means first and foremost improved tax legislation, 
particularly the part regarding the process of taxation and the tax administration operations. 
Nonetheless, some other areas should not be neglected, like enforcing the contracts, registering 
property employing workers, closing a business, since they consist major costs of doing business 
in Serbia. 
chapter v 
Conclusions
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Greenfield investments are seen as a major (42%) mode of FDI entry in Central and Eastern 
Europe. This is partly because major privatizations have already been performed, and also 
because efficiency-seeking investors are estimating a good future for this region.  During the 
past six years, the transition economies have become a record FDI recipient and the second 
most competitive region worldwide (second only to Asia among emerging markets). A new trend 
recorded in these countries is that privatization-led FDIs have declined and Greenfield invest-
ments have grown in both the East and Central European countries. Hungary, Poland, Romania 
and the Czech Republic have become important Greenfield destinations. Within South Eastern 
European countries, a clear distinction emerged between four countries (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Croatia and Serbia), on the one side, and the other four SEE countries (BIH, Albania, Macedonia 
and Montenegro), who attracted several times less abundant FDI flows.
As for Serbia, owing to a well-chosen privatization method, the country has been evidencing 
growing FDI inflows since 2000. The surge in 2006, however, is not likely to be repeated in the 
near future, since it coincided with peak FDIs in the whole region, and came primarily as a 
consequence of the privatization of the mobile telecommunications company Mobtel, purchased 
by Telenor for almost EUR 1,513 million (slightly less than USD 1.9bn), followed by Philip Morris, 
mobilkom austria group and many others. A decline in 2007 was followed by political turbulences 
in 2008 and many investment opportunities are still waiting to be realized.
Serbia remains a country with the smallest share of tradables, which should be a serious warning 
to economic policy makers when analyzing the results of recent FDI flows. Empirical studies have 
shown that growth tends to be more sustainable in countries with strongly performing tradables 
sectors. Ireland is an example in Europe of rapid and sustainable catch-up with large capital 
inflows, in particular FDI, that boosted export production. Portugal, on the other hand, is an 
example of stalled catch-up, with large inflows of capital into consumption and investments in 
nontradables, including real estate. The widening current account deficit became unsustainable 
as competitiveness was lost following real exchange rate appreciation, and the boom turned 
bust as growth slowed down. While all FDIs should by no means be welcomed, economic policy 
should deeply investigate success stories in attracting FDIs from the tradables sector and try to 
imitate their success.
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A question remains unsolved in economics as to whether investments lead growth or arise as 
consequences of economic growth. But when trying to resolve the difference in the influence of 
the Greenfield and the brownfield investments on economic growth, the results are that both 
Greenfield and M&A FDIs lead domestic investment but are led by GDP growth. Therefore, 
economic growth, as the most important indicator of domestic rates of return, serves as an 
effective “pull” factor for foreign investment; and in turn, FDI helps increase domestic investment 
in the future. In addition, a stronger correlation has been found between Greenfield investments 
and economic growth (0.42) as compared to total investments (0.26) and economic growth. The 
analysis on the impact of FDIs on economic growth for thirteen countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe over the whole transition period shows that FDI indeed had a significant positive impact 
on the rate of economic growth, and that countries that were less successful in attracting FDI 
generated less growth than they might have. In other words, the outcome of the empirical inves-
tigation assigns FDI an important role as a growth determinant as well.
The assertion that FDIs would automatically lead to a strong increase in production and 
employment can often be misleading, since it is not the level of FDI that matters, but the kind 
of FDI. Only Greenfield and horizontal investment turn out to create new employment in the 
short run, while other FDI modes operate as a buffer to reductions in overall employment (but 
significant cross-country differences are recorded as well).
Regardless of the type of FDI the long term effect from the FDI induced productivity gains 
on labor demand are positive. In addition to these potential effects, which in principle apply to 
all kinds of private capital inflows, the gains to host countries from FDI can take several other 
forms. For example, FDI also brings significant transfer of technology that cannot be achieved 
through financial investments or trade in goods and services. FDI can also promote competition 
in the domestic input market. Recipients of FDI often gain employee training in the course 
of operating the new businesses, which contributes to human capital development in the host 
country.  Profits generated by FDI contribute to corporate tax revenues in the host country. 
Depending on the type of FDIs, whether market or efficiency seeking, FDIs can become 
successful exporters. In the case of Hungary and Ireland, eight out of the ten greatest exporters 
are Greenfield investments, with export share in sales of over 80%. Still, a brownfield investor, 
US Steel, represents the Serbian greatest exporter so far. Other investors, such as Greenfield 
Ball Packaging, stand for an extremely successful, but unfortunately almost the only case of, 
efficiency-seeking FDI in Serbia. Most FDIs in Serbia are market-seeking and belong to the 
non-tradable sector. Still, most of them are extremely important for improving the Serbian 
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business environment: from telecommunications (Telenor, Vip) to a whole set of FDIs in banking, 
insurance, and retail. Not only do they raise competitiveness, but they also create an environment 
which can then become more attractive to efficiency-seeking FDIs. These types of FDIs are 
utterly important for the economic stability of the country since they help in preventing balance 
of payments from overheating (deteriorating), which has recently become a serious problem of 
the Serbian economy.
Most studies examining the “net assessments” of the impact of FDI in some 30 countries over 
the past 15 years have found “a clearly positive impact on the economic welfare of the host”. 
Additionally, macroeconomic country studies generally have found a positive impact of FDIs. 
It remains the challenge for a host country to make its environment competitive enough and 
to attract the best investors and, thus, maximally increase economic growth, employment and 
export opportunities of the country.
There is no doubt that spillover effects of the FDIs, particularly of the Greenfield FDIs, are 
substantial and important for the economic growth and welfare of the recipient country’s 
society. It was demonstrated that these effects are versatile and that they have an impact on both 
producers and consumers. At the end of the day there is also a beneficial impact to consumers. 
Spillover effects are particularly important in some industries, such as modern telecommunica-
tions and banking, as they have become a kind of a prerequisite for modern economic growth, a 
growth of the new economy.
Substantial spillover effects of the Greenfield FDIs in Serbia have been recorded in the area of 
increasing competition (competitive pressure, i.e. rivalry) rendering a higher quality of products, 
introducing new services by imitation, both downstream and upstream vertical links to domestic 
suppliers and purchasers, and investments in human capital.
There are two very important findings regarding the recipient country. The first one is that 
it has proven impossible to measure precisely spillover effects and to disclose then in monetary 
terms, as methodological obstacles are too high. Taking this into account, it should be recom-
mended that a country not subsidize FDIs. Some people find rationale for such subsidies in the 
very fact that investors are not capturing the spillover effects they are producing, so they should 
be compensated for that. However, without precise measurement such compensation is not 
feasible, let alone the damage that it can do as private interests capture the state. These dangers 
are rather relevant for thinking about public policies regarding Greenfield FDIs in Serbia. 
The second finding is that the scale and scope of spillover effects heavily depend on the 
recipient country, predominantly local firms and their absorptive capacity. It is of crucial impor-
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tance that the gap between foreign direct investors and local firms is not too big; otherwise, the 
spillover effects will be negligible. It is the labor force of the country which is crucial for the 
absorptive capacity. The more flexible and better educated the labor market, the better labor 
force propensity toward greater absorptive capacity.  
It was demonstrated that labor in Serbia is not a cheap resource. It is the flexibility of the 
labor force and its ability to learn fast that attracts FDI to Serbia. The labor force in Serbia has 
its own quality and dynamism, and it is highly motivated and adaptable – it can adapt to new 
business principles and culture. Locally trained engineers are considered as the best offspring 
of the Serbian education system. Furthermore, the Serbian labor force is rather loyal to the 
employer and employee turnover is much smaller than in some EE countries.
The business environment is decisive for investors to make their decisions about FDIs in 
general and Greenfield investment in particular. Many components of that environment are 
endogenous, i.e., the recipient country’s government can do something about it. Although Serbia 
has substantially improved its business environment in the recent years, there is huge room for 
improvement. A single area that needs to be significantly improved is the one related to “dealing 
with licenses”, i.e., the costs of developing a plot of land. Since this specific cost/obstacle is 
relevant for Greenfield investments only, this is perhaps a part of the answer to the question 
about why other forms of FDIs have been more intensive. As it was demonstrated, this particular 
obstacle proved to be a combination of poor legislation and its unproductive enforcement by local 
authorities who are in charge of its implementation. Obviously there is room for improvement 
on both levels, particularly as competition for attracting FDIs can be developed among the local 
authorities in Serbia in, for example, creating industrial parks.
Improvement regarding paying taxes means first and foremost improved tax legislation 
and administration, particularly regarding the process of taxation and the tax administration 
operations. Nonetheless, other areas should not be neglected, such as enforcing contracts and 
registering property (both heavily dependent on judiciary reform), as well as employing workers 
and closing a business, since all of these activities comprise major costs of doing business in 
Serbia.
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Acquisition A corporate action in which a company buys most, if not all, of the target company’s 
ownership stakes in order to assume control of the target firm. Acquisitions are 
often made as part of a company’s growth strategy, whereby it is more beneficial 
to take over an existing firm’s operations and niche compared to expanding 
on its own. Acquisitions are often paid in cash, the acquiring company’s stock 
or a combination of both.   Acquisitions can be either friendly or hostile. 
Friendly acquisitions occur when the target firm expresses its agreement to be 
acquired, whereas hostile acquisitions don’t have the same agreement from the 
target firm and the acquiring firm needs to actively purchase large stakes of the 
target company in order to have a majority stake
In either case, the acquiring company often offers a premium on the market 
price of the target company’s shares in order to entice shareholders to sell. For 
example, News Corp.’s bid to acquire Dow Jones was equal to a 65% premium 
over the stock’s market price
Reference: OECD Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions 
Agglomeration The phenomenon of economic activity congregating in or close to a single 
location, rather than being spread out uniformly over space. 
Reference: Deardorff’s Glossary of International Economics
Agglomeration 
economy
Any benefit that accrues to economic agents as a result of having large 
numbers of other agents geographically close to them, thus tending to lead to 
agglomeration. 
Reference: Deardorff’s Glossary of International Economics
Glossary
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Brownfield investment When a company or government entity purchases or leases existing production 
facilities to launch a new production activity. This is one strategy used in foreign-
direct investment.  The alternative to this is a Greenfield investment, where a 
new plant is constructed. 
Reference: INvestopedia
Definition of FDI 
/ Foreign Direct 
Investment
FDI stands for Foreign Direct Investment, a component of a country’s national 
financial accounts. Foreign direct investment is investment of foreign assets into 
domestic structures, equipment, and organizations. It does not include foreign 
investment into the stock markets. Foreign direct investment is thought to be 
more useful to a country than investments in the equity of its companies because 
equity investments are potentially “hot money” which can leave at the first sign 
of trouble, whereas FDI is durable and generally useful whether things go well or 
badly. Reference: (Econterms) 
This category of international investment is made by a resident entity in one 
economy (direct investor) with the objective of establishing/obtaining a lasting 
interest in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the investor 
(direct investment enterprise). ”Lasting interest” implies the existence of a long-
term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant 
degree of influence by the direct investor on the management of the direct 
investment enterprise. Direct investment involves both the initial transaction 
between the two entities and all subsequent transactions between them and 
among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. 
Reference: 5th edition of Balance of Payment Manual (BPM5) (International 
Monetary Fund); Detailed Benchmark Definition of the Foreign Direct Investment 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development); and Glossary of 
Foreign Direct Investment Terms (Survey of Implementation of Methodological 
Standards for Direct Investment (SIMSDI)
Externality or spillover An externality or spillover exists whenever the production or consumption decisions 
of one individual unintentionally impact on the production or consumption 
decisions of others in some way other than through the market.
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Foreign Direct 
Investment Enterprise 
A foreign direct investment enterprise is an enterprise resident in one economy 
and in which an investor resident in another economy owns, either directly or 
indirectly, 10% or more of its voting power if it is incorporated or the equivalent 
for an unincorporated enterprise. 
The numerical threshold of ownership of 10% of the voting power determines 
the existence of a direct investment relationship between the direct investor and 
the direct investment enterprise. An ownership of at least 10% of the voting 
power of the enterprise is regarded as the necessary evidence that the investor 
has sufficient influence to have an effective voice in its management. 
Foreign Direct Investor A foreign direct investor is an entity (an institutional unit) resident in one 
economy that has acquired, either directly or indirectly, at least 10% of the 
voting power of a corporation (enterprise), or equivalent for an unincorporated 
enterprise, resident in another economy. A direct investor could be classified to 
any sector of the economy and could be any of the following:
(i) an individual; 
(ii) a group of related individuals;  
(iii) an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise;  
(iv) a public or private enterprise;  
(v) a group of related enterprises;  
(vi) a government body; 
(vii) an estate, trust or other societal organization;  
(viii) any combination of the above. 
In the case where two enterprises each own 10% or more of each other’s voting 
power, each is a direct investor in the other. 
A direct investor has a direct investment enterprise operating in a country other 
than the economy of residence of the foreign direct investor. 
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Foreign Equity 
Capital 
Foreign equity capital comprises: (i) equity in branches; (ii) all shares in 
subsidiaries and associates (except nonparticipating, preferred shares that are 
treated as debt securities and included under direct investment, other capital); 
and (iii) other capital contributions of foreign investors in a direct investment 
enterprise. 
Reference: 5th edition of Balance of Payment Manual (BPM5), International 
Monetary Fund;
Greenfield investment A form of foreign direct investment where a parent company starts a new venture 
in a foreign country by constructing new operational facilities from the ground 
up. In addition to building new facilities, most parent companies also create new 
long-term jobs in the foreign country by hiring new employees.
This is opposite to a brownfield investment. Greenfield investments occur when 
multinational corporations enter into developing countries to build new factories 
and/or stores.
Developing countries often offer prospective companies tax-breaks, subsidies 
and other types of incentives to set up Greenfield investments. Governments 
often see that losing corporate tax revenue is a small price to pay if jobs are 
created and knowledge and technology is gained to boost the country’s human 
capital.
Reference: INvestopedia
Gross domestic 
product (GDP)
A measure of the value of all the goods and services newly produced in an 
economy during a specified period of time.
Horizontal and 
vertical FDIs
The most evident form of FDI is Horizontal FDI, which involves investments in 
the same industry abroad as the firm does at home. The second group, Vertical 
FDI can be subdivided into two forms.
Backward vertical FDI is the mode of vertical FDI where an industry abroad 
provides an input for a firm’s domestic production process. When an industry 
abroad sells the output of a firm’s domestic production process, we speak about 
Forward vertical FDI.
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Internal Knowledge 
Spillover
Internal knowledge spillover is positive learning or knowledge externalities 
between programs or plants within a production organization.
Reference: (Econterms)
Liabilities, Direct 
Investment
Direct investment liabilities can be ascribed to the following three categories:
(i) investment of non-resident direct investor in resident direct investment 
enterprises 
(ii) reverse investment of non-resident direct investment enterprises in resident 
direct investors 
(iii) investment of non-resident fellow enterprises in resident fellow 
enterprises. 
Reference: OECD Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions 
Management Risk Management risk refers to the chance that company managers will put their own 
interests ahead of the interest of the company and shareholders. Management 
risk also applies to investment managers, whose decisions and actions may divert 
from investors’ wishes or reduce the value of an investment portfolio. The risks 
are associated with ineffective, destructive or underperforming management, 
which hurts shareholders and the company or fund being managed. This term 
refers to the risk of the situation in which the company and shareholders would 
have been better off without the choices made by management.
Reference: INvestopedia
Merger A merger occurs when two (or more) companies agree to merge into a new single 
company rather than remain separated for creating business synergies. 
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Other foreign direct 
investment capital
Other foreign direct investment capital covers the borrowing or lending of funds 
between foreign direct investors and subsidiaries, branches, and associates 
– including debt securities, suppliers’ credit, and nonparticipating, preferred 
shares (which are treated as debt securities).
Reference: 5th edition of Balance of Payment Manual (BPM5), International 
Monetary Fund; 1993 System of National Accounts Detailed Benchmark Definition 
of the Foreign Direct Investment, Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development); and Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms, Survey of 
Implementation of Methodological Standards for Direct Investment (SIMSDI) 
1993 System of National Accounts
Outward Direct 
Investment
Outward direct investment is investment by a resident direct investor in a non-
resident direct investment enterprise; the direction of the influence by the 
direct investor is “outward” for the reporting economy. Also referred to as direct 
investment abroad. 
Reference: OECD Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions
Political Risk Political risk is the risk that an investment’s returns could suffer as a result 
of political changes or instability in a country. Instability affecting investment 
returns could stem from a change in government, legislative bodies, other foreign 
policy makers, or military control.
Political risk is also known as “geopolitical risk”, and becomes more of a factor 
as the time horizon of an investment gets longer. Political risks are notoriously 
hard to quantify because there are limited sample sizes or case studies when 
discussing an individual nation. Some political risks can be insured against 
through international agencies or other government bodies.  
The outcome of a political risk could drag down investment returns or even go so 
far as to remove the ability to withdraw capital from an investment
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Reinvested earnings 
and undistributed 
branch profits 
of foreign direct 
investment 
enterprises 
These are comprised of foreign direct investors’ shares, in proportion to equity 
held, of earnings that foreign subsidiaries and associated enterprises do not 
distribute as dividends (reinvested earnings), and earnings that branches 
and other unincorporated enterprises do not remit to foreign direct investors 
(undistributed branch profits). 
Reference: 5th edition of Balance of Payment Manual (BPM5), International 
Monetary Fund; 1993 System of National Accounts
Resident of an economy Resident of an economy is an entity that has a center of economic interest in 
the economic territory of a country, usually indicated by a one-year stay in that 
economy. The one-year period is suggested only as a guideline and not as an 
inflexible rule
References: 5th edition of Balance of Payment Manual (BPM5) (International 
Monetary Fund); Detailed Benchmark Definition of the Foreign Direct Investment 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development); and Glossary of 
Foreign Direct Investment Terms (Survey of Implementation of Methodological 
Standards for Direct Investment (SIMSDI) 1993 System of National Accounts
Transfer Pricing The transaction value for a good or service between related enterprises may not 
always reflect market values. Transfer pricing refers to the distortion between 
transaction values and market values. It can motivated by income distribution 
or equity injections or withdrawals. Where the distortion is significant and data 
is available to do so, it is recommended that adjustments be made to remove the 
impact of transfer pricing.
Reference: OECD Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and 
Definitions 
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